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REINSURANCE: THE SILENT REGULATOR?
Aviva Abramovsky*

This article suggests that a discussion on insurance regulation
should include a consideration of the effect that reinsurance may
have on the behavior of insurers. The traditional types of
reinsurance are reviewed, and the ability of private reinsurance
contracts to produce insurer action is considered If reinsuranceis
not included in a holistic examination of the field, its realities have
the capacity to misdirect insurance regulatory assumptions.
Moreover, reinsuranceworks as a source of independent and often
unexamined contractual influence on insurer activity, and as a
potential source of interference with regulatoryproposals. Even
though reinsuranceis initiatedby private contract, those contracts
have the potentialforregulatoryeffect sufficient toprovide a positive
answer to this Essay's main query: may reinsurance correctly be
termed a "silent regulator"?
"The first principle of regulation is: Lawyers and politicians write
rules; and markets develop ways to circumvent these rules without
violating them."'

*Associate Professor, Syracuse University College of Law. The author
would
like to thank the Searle Center for its generous support of this research and for the
author's inclusion in its symposium. The author would like to recognize the staff
of the H. Douglas Barclay Law Library at the Syracuse University College of Law
for their invaluable help in producing this work.
'Allan H. Meltzer, Regulatory Overkill, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2008 at A14.
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INTRODUCTION

When evaluating the efficacy of insurance regulation, the nature
and availability of reinsurance is not often considered. 2 Yet, as "the
insurance of insurance companies''3, reinsurance should not be so quickly
dismissed as irrelevant in the regulatory discussion.4 Just as insurance is
often viewed as having a regulatory effect on insured industries, so too
should reinsurance be considered as having a regulatory effect on its
reinsureds.
Initially, a brief discussion of the concept of regulation is
necessary.
The term "regulation" commonly evokes thoughts of
governmental action and visions of the regulatory state. For good or ill,
thoughts of regulation are usually linked with thoughts of state power. Yet
such a restrictive vision of regulation is simplistic and ignores the capacity
of private institutions to regulate the activities of large swaths of social
actors. This ability has led to the development of a fascinating body of
literature which examines the myriad ways private or quasi-private
insurance can regulate private behavior. With the concept of power not
limited to overt government action alone, insurance takes its place among
regulators of social behaviors with surprising force and scope. Indeed, it
has been stated that "looking at twentieth century governance, it is
tempting to see insurance as the sleeping giant of power." 5
Identifying insurance as a private regulator stems from the idea that
insurance works as a mechanism to set social standards. Insurance is an
This is not overly surprising since, as one commentator noted, "development
of reinsurance in the United States has, for much of its history, gone largely
unrecorded." See William Hoffmnan, FacultativeReinsuranceContractFormation,
Documentation,and Integration,38 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAc. L.J. 763, 777 (20022003).
2

3See Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Stronghold Ins. Co., 77 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1996).
4 See

Gary Marchitello, Ignore Reinsurance at Your Peril,RISK MGMT. MAG.,
Dec. 2007, at 46 ("Discounting the importance of the vital role of reinsurance in
risk spreading and how the pricing, stability and capacity of reinsurance can
influence the viability of one's own direct insurance purchases can be a critical and
potentially costly mismanagement.").
5 See

Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon, EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING
12 (2002).

CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY
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acknowledged gatekeeper of many economic activities, from buying a
home to driving a car to executing a complex financial transaction. Some
of this regulatory effect results from a direct delegation of state power by
mandating the purchase of insurance as a prerequisite to such things as
operating a car or entering a certain business, much, however, does not.
When insurance is purchased without governmental compulsion, the nature
of the obligations acquired alongside the indemnity function of insurance
can be viewed as a form of "private legislation" within the regime of
traditional notions of liberal governance.6
The corollary of the idea of insurance as private regulator of
policyholders is to consider the concept of reinsurance as a source of
private regulation of reinsured insurance companies. In effect, if insurance
is a "sleeping giant of power", how much more so is the power of
reinsurers to affect the behavior and choices of insurers themselves?
Through this vantage point, the reinsurance relationship begins to emerge
as a subject requiring careful review and analysis in the regulatory context.
Though purely private in origin 7 and function,8 reinsurance of insurance
6 Id.
at

13.

3 NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE: SEPARATE LINES
OF INSURANCE, § 40.01, at 6 (2007) ("The reinsurance relationship is evidenced by
7 See

a written contract reflecting the negotiated terms. Although reinsurance contracts

between different cedents and reinsurers can include clauses with similar purposes,
the wording of particular provisions varies significantly, depending on the parties'
specific needs, customs and practices.").
See ROBERT H.

II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 142(d), at
1021 (4th ed. 2007) ("In many respects, the relationship between primary insurer
8

JERRY,

and reinsurer tracks that of the original insured and the primary insurer. The
primary insurer and reinsurer have a duty to deal with each other in good faith, and

the reinsurer will have available to it the defense of misrepresentation, breach of
warranty, fraud, or concealment in circumstances where the primary insurer's acts
or neglect giv e rise to the defense."). See also STEVEN PLITT,ET AL., IA COUCH
ON INSURANCE § 9:17 (3d ed. 2008) ("Duties of good faith and fair dealing run
between the reinsurer and the reinsured much as they do between the initial insured
and his or her insurer. This duty originates from the reinsurer's need to rely upon
and not duplicate the reinsured's efforts in properly evaluating risks and handling
claims, reducing costs for both parties to the reinsurance contract. Accordingly,
this duty requires the reinsured to disclose to the reinsurer all material facts which
may affect the subject risk. The extension of this duty of good faith is the related
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policies is common practice of the domestic insurance industry. 9 For
reasons described below, the benefits of reinsurance to an insurer are
manifold'0 and the likelihood that an insurer will seek reinsurance at some
point great." Hence the function of this Essay: to determine whether
concept that reinsurers are generally bound by the reinsured's good faith decision
to pay a claim, commonly referred to as the 'follow the settlements' doctrine.").
9 Though reinsurance agreements may use any language the parties may
choose to effectuate their agreements, commonly found reinsurance clauses
abound. See BARRY OSTRAGER & THOMAS NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE
COVERAGE DISPUTES § 15.03(b), at 997 (12th ed. 2003) ("Reinsurance treaties

may contain 'follow the fortunes,' 'errors and omissions,' 'notice,' 'arbitration,'
'claims cooperation,' 'salvage and subrogation,' 'allocation of expenses,' 'extra
contractual obligations,' 'punitive damages' and/or 'cut through clauses.' The
wording of these clauses in different reinsurance certificates and treaties can also
vary substantially.").
Fundamentals of Property
and Casualty Reinsurance 4 (2009) http://www.reinsurance.org/files/
("Reinsurance provides protection
public/07FundamentalsandGlossaryl.pdf
against catastrophic loss in much the same way it helps stabilize an insurer's loss
experience. Insurers use reinsurance to protect against catastrophes in two ways.
First, reinsurance protects against catastrophic financial loss resulting from a single
event, such as the total fire loss of a large manufacturing plant. Second,
reinsurance also protects against the aggregation of many smaller claims resulting
from a single event, such as an earthquake or major hurricane, that affects many
policyholders simultaneously. While the insurer is able to cover losses
individually, the aggregate may be more than the insurer wishes to retain.").
10 See REINSURANCE AsSOCIATION OF AMERICA,

11See Anna Walker, Harnessing the Free Market: Reinsurance Models for
FDICInsurance Pricing,18 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 735, 742-43 (1994-1995)

("Reinsurance is sought by primary insurers for various reasons. From an
economic standpoint, reinsurance permits an efficient specialization of skills. In a
simplified world, primary insurers are small, local, and specialized; reinsurers, on
the other hand, are well capitalized international corporations with highly
diversified risk portfolios. Primary insurers, because of their proximity to and
knowledge of the insured, have an advantage over reinsurers in soliciting
customers, pricing policies, and monitoring insureds for moral hazard. Reinsurers,
on the other hand, have advantages in raising capital and diversifying and
managing risk, particularly the risk of a catastrophe which might bankrupt a small
private insurer. Insurers, therefore, can trade their advantages in pricing and moral
hazard monitoring for the greater risk-bearing capacity of the reinsurer. Primary
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reinsurance can properly be understood as a little acknowledged and "silent
regulator" of the insurance industry.
To that end, Section II of this article will describe what reinsurance
is and why insurers seek it. Section III will explore the main purposes of
reinsurance. Section IV will review various ways reinsurance has the
capacity to influence certain insurance industry behaviors. This will
include a review of reinsurance's effects on reinsured's underwriting and
claims handling practices, along with a discussion of general consumer
protection issues. Section V will offer a conclusion.
Before beginning that discussion, it is important to note that
insurance is not, of course, an unregulated industry, though it is the only
major financial industry regulated primarily at the state level. State
regulators coordinate their efforts through the highly competent National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).12 Moreover, these state
regulators share identifiable and reasonably identical goals in the
performance of their duties. Among these are the promotion of competitive
and sound insurance markets and the enforcement of insurance laws to
assure consumers of fair treatment and protection from unfair trade
practices 13 Throughout the course of this Essay, therefore, mention will be

insurers also may find reinsurance necemeeting regulatory restrictions that limit
exposure to any individual risk. By retaining only a portion of each insured risk,
the insurer is able to insure a greater variety of risks with the same amount of
capital, assuming that state regulators permit it to subtract reinsured risk from its
reserve requirements.").
See National Association of Insurance Commissioners, http://www.naic.org/
(last visited Feb. 11, 2009).
12

Insurance regulatory interests include the perennial issues of risk
containment and default. However, risk of default is not the sole purview of
insurance regulation. Included in regulatory efforts are issues of political interest,
such as guaranteeing equitable access to insurance, and other redistributive and
equitable normative policies. For example, the Connection Department of
Insurance describes its mission as follows:
13

The mission of the Connecticut Insurance Department is to serve
consumers in a professional and timely manner by providing
assistance and information to the public and to policy makers, by
regulating the insurance industry in a fair and efficient manner which
promotes a competitive and financially sound insurance market for
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made of reinsurance's potential as a source of support or hindrance to
insurance regulatory interests. Such review gains added importance with
the recognition that, other than as regards some issues of solvency, the
reinsurance industry is generally unregulated at all. 14
II.

REINSURANCE: WHAT IS IT AND WHY HAVE IT?

At its most reductive, reinsurance is a relatively straightforward
financial transaction by which an insurance company is indemnified for all
or a portion of some risk by another insurer. 5 This risk transfer, just as
with common consumer or commercial insurance policies, is effectuated by
contract, with the reinsurance agreement mainly subject to ordinary
contract rules and doctrine. Some practices of reinsurance contract
interpretation are distinct from the practices used in interpreting a more
common insurance policy, but at this juncture
it is sufficient to recognize
16
that reinsurance is a creature of contract.

consumers, and by enforcing the insurance laws to ensure that
consumers are treated fairly and are protected from unfair practices.
Connecticut Department of Insurance: Our Mission Statement (Aug. 25,
2008), http://www.ct.gov/cid/cwp/view.asp?q=254396.
14

See

REINSURANCE

ASSOCIATION

OF AMERICA,

supranote 11, at 13 ("Since

reinsurance regulation focuses on solvency, it safeguards the validity of
reinsurance policies and, at the same time, maintains flexibility in the business of
reinsurance. By focusing on the reinsurer, rather than on the reinsurance contract,
primary insurance companies are allowed to purchase reinsurance to suit their
particular business needs. Of course, reinsurance contracts are entered into by two
or more insurance companies - the reinsurer(s) and the insurer(s). Recognizing
that there are always some exceptions to the rule, the two companies are generally

expected to be knowledgeable about the insurance business.

Therefore, the

oversight necessary in primary insurance to protect consumer interests is not
essentialin the reinsurancebusiness.") (emphasis added).
15 See JERRY, supra note 9,

§ 140(a), at 1015 ("Reinsurance is essentially a

form of insurance for insurance companies.").
16

PLrrr, supra note 9, § 9:6. ("Although some rules of construction do not

apply to contracts in the reinsurance context, the general rules of contract do apply
to reinsurance contracts.").
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A. WHAT IS REINSURANCE?
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of the study of reinsurance stems
from the particularly opaque and obscure language endemic to the
industry. 17 Some discussion of terms is necessary. As reinsurance involves
a minimum of two insurance companies, different terms have developed to
identify the various parties.18 The original insurer who acquired the risk or
liability is referred to by a variety of designations, including that of direct
or initial insurer and sometimes, though less commonly, as the primitive
insurer.19 However designated, once it has entered into an agreement with
a new insurer for the purpose of reinsurance, the original insurer is
thereafter most commonly referred to as the reinsured. 20 Though that
seems clear enough, the original insurer is frequently referred to by another
more exotic definition, that of cedent.2' This designation stems from the
idea that the function of reinsurance is for the original insurer to "cede" 22a
certain amount of its business to the reinsurer, hence the term cedent.
17 See JERRY, supra note 9, § 140(a), at 1015 ("The business of reinsurance

has developed some special terminology."). See also NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE
LAW PRACTICE GUIDE, supranote 8, § 40.01, at § 40.05 (2007) ("Reinsurance, like
many areas ofbusiness law, has a language of its own.").
18

See PLITT, supra note 8, § 9:2 ("There are two parties to a reinsurance

agreement, but these parties have been bestowed with multiple names which are
used interchangeably and are all accurate.").
19

See

GRAYDON S. STARING, THE LAW OF REINSURANCE §

1:1, at 3 (Supp.

2008) ("The original insurer, sometimes called the direct, or initial, insurer, and
occasionally the primitive insurer, is commonly called the reinsured or, especially
in England, the reassured.").
20

See

OSTRAGER,

supranote 10, § 15.01(c), at 992 (noting a ceding insurer or

reinsured is "the insurer that transfers all or a portion of the risk it underwrites to a
reinsurer.").
21

See

STARING,

supra note 20, § 1:1, at 3 ("The reinsured is said to cede

business to the reinsurer, or reassurer, and is therefore also referred to as the ceding
company or the cedent (or cedant)."). See also NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW
PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 8, § 40.01 ("The insurance company purchasing
reinsurance is called the 'ceding company' (or the 'cedent' (or 'cedant'),
'reinsured' or 'ceding insurer') because it 'cedes' or transfers part of the risk.").
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Likewise, a reinsurer may itself seek reinsurance, called retrocessions, in
the same forms and for the same purposes as any other insurers.2 3 Hence,
the reinsurer of a reinsurer is often called a retrocessionaire.2 4
As a descriptive matter, reinsurance is inherently a contract of
insurance, albeit a secondary one. 25 Reinsurance is commonly defined as a
contract "by which an insurer procures a third person to insure him against
loss or liability by reason of such original insurance., 26 More generally,
22

See JERRY, supra note 9, § 140[a], at 1054 ("The act of transferring the risk

is called 'ceding,' and the portion of the risk passed to the reinsurer is called the
'cession."').
See PLITT,supranote 9, § 9:3 (The retrocessional agreement, like any other
reinsurance agreement, is a contract and will be effective according to its terms.
These terms need not mirror the specific risks of the reinsurance agreement which
it is reinsuring. As can quickly be deduced, with the expansion of the insuring
scenario from one to three or more separate agreements, all of which may cover
different risks and have different exclusions, the resolution of indemnity
responsibility can easily become complex).
23

The preponderance of French terminology likely arises from the early
statutory action by the French Courts in the reinsurance business. For instance,
notice ofthe 1681 Ordonnance de la Marine of Louis XIV provided that:
24

The insurers may reinsure with others the effects they may have insured, and
the insured may likewise cause to be insured the premium of insurance, and the
solvency of the insurers.
STARING, supra note 20,§ 1:4, at 6 (providing translation of Article XX, Title
Sixth of the 1681 Ordonnance).
PLITT, supra note 9, § 9:1 ("Reinsurance is a contract whereby one insurer
transfers or 'cedes' to another insurer all or part of the risk it has assumed under a
separate or distinct policy or group of policies in exchange for a portion of the
25

premium ... While reinsurance technically qualifies as insurance, it is a contract

for indemnity rather than liability.").
26

See

STARING,

supra note 20, § 1:1, at 2 (This definition allows for the

inclusion of both an existing policy or contract of reinsurance and assumes that the
requirements of the contract are met. A "reinsurance policy" can therefore simply
be understood as a "contract for indemnity one insurer makes with another to
protect the insurer from risks already assumed." Likewise a treaty looking forward
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reinsurance includes all contractual arrangements where one insurance
company transfers to another all or some portion of the risk it underwrites
Thus, the common refrain that reinsurance is
to another insurer.27
insurance for insurance companies.2 s
One of the hardships in understanding reinsurance is that the term
is sometimes used over-broadly and applied to relationships which are best
understood as something other than a commonly accepted definition of
reinsurance. 29
Reinsurance is best understood as distinct from coto reinsure would constitute reinsurance, though such agreement may be better
understood as a contract for reinsurance, rather than a contract of reinsurance. In
either case, reinsurance policies, reinsurance treaties on specific classes of risk and
reinsurance treaties entered into for future acquired risk would all come within the
heading of reinsurance); OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supranote 10, § 15.01, at 990.
27

See Colonial Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Comm'r, 491 U.S. 244 (1989); OSTRAGER

&NEWMAN, supranote 10, § 15.01[a], at 990.
28

See Cont'l Cas v. Stronghold Ins. Co., Ltd., et al., 77 F.3d 16, 17, 20 (2d

Cir. 1996). In that case, the Second Circuit offered an additional colorful and
intuitive explanation of reinsurance adopted in a New York Court of Appeals
decision of the late 1930's. See id.at 17. (discussing People ex. rel. Sea Ins. Co. v.
Graves, 274 N.Y. 312, 15 (1937)) (The concept of reinsurance "dates back to the
time the first bookie, fearful that he could not cover all his bets in the event he
were to lose, decided to spread his risk 'laying-off" the risk by getting other
bookies to share his exposure."). Though colorful, that assessment is not entirely
accurate. The earliest recordings of the use of reinsurance likely predated the
iteration of the modem bookie and has been historically identified as predating the
17th century. See STARING, supra note 20, § 1:4, at 5-6 ("The earliest recorded
instance is said to have been a policy written on a voyage from Genoa to Sluys and
reinsured for the more hazardous portion, from Cardiz to Sluys, the insurer
retaining the Mediterranean portion of the risk."). The New York courts were not
altogether mistaken as England likely recognized the relationship between
insurance and speculation in the 18 th Century and prohibited marine reinsurance by
the Marine Act of 1745. Addressing that Parliamentary Act, Lord Mansfield noted
that, "The statute doubtless was intended to prevent gambling. I suppose that the
mischief was that policies were underwritten at one premium and reassurance
affected at another." In Re Norwich Equitable Fire Assurance Soc'y 57 LT REP.
241, 243 (1887).
29

See JERRY, supra note 9, § 140[a], at 1053 ("Reinsurance should not be

confused with the situation where one insured takes out two or more policies
covering the same risk with two or more insurers. Also, reinsurance should not be
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insurance, the proper term for the relationship which forms when separate
insurers, either jointly or severally, assume direct shares of a given risk; in
such cases where all the insurers have a direct relationship with the insured,
the relationship is not within the traditional understanding of reinsurance.30
Likewise, reinsurance should be distinguished from banking even though it
may assist in the reinsured's financing and allow for insurance loss
amortization.3 1
In a true reinsurance contract, the risk indemnified is the risk that
the insurer will have to pay on the underlying insured risk.32 Reinsurance
is an aspect of insurance and, to the extent that it is regulated at all, is
regulated under the rubric of insurance.
By entering into a contract to
reinsure, the reinsurer agrees to indemnify the ceding insurer for any
liability incurred by the insurer that is covered by the reinsurance
confused with the situation where the insured cancels one policy and substitutes
another for it . . .Reinsurance only exists where a primary insurer becomes a

'reinsured' by entering into a contract with another insurer, the 'reinsurer."').

§ 1:5, at 9-10 ("Reinsurance is not
coinsurance, which is the relationship that results when separate insurers, either
severally or jointly, assume direct shares of a given risk; in that case, all the
insurers have a direct contract with the insured. It also is not a partnership, coventure, or syndication, even though the contract may contain clauses creating or
permitting joint responsibilities or control, as well as joint loss, since true
30

See STARING, supra note 20,

reinsurance lacks essential characteristics of those relationships.").
31Id.at 10 ("Neither is reinsurance banking, although it performs a function of

banking by providing the amortization of insurance losses and may, in effect,
finance the growth of the reinsured.").
32

Risk is transferred by a variety of financial transactions, not all, or even

most of which, constitute insurance. Though insurance itself remains a somewhat
elusive definitional concept, the indemnity function, particularly when combined
with some aspect of fortuity is often seen as core insurance principles. See PLITT,
supra note 9, § 9:24. ("Because the reinsurance agreement is a contract of
indemnity, the liability of the reinsurer is inextricably tied to the loss of the
reinsured."); OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10, § 15.01 [a], at 990; Travelers
Idem. Co. v. Scor Reins. Co., 62 F.3d 74, 76 (2d Cir. 1995) (Reinsurance is
generally understood as a contract for indemnity not one of liability); Transcont'l

Underwriters Agency v. Am. Agency Underwriters, 680 F.2d 298, 299 n.2 (3d Cir.
1982).
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agreement.33 Importantly for our later discussions, the liabilities covered
under a reinsuring agreement can extend beyond the cost of direct losses
accrued by the cedent insurer's policyholder under the original policy to
include such things as the cedent's costs of investigation and settlement of
claims.34 Examples of other potentially indemnified insurer losses can
even include losses arising from the reinsured's own bad faith - such as
in excess of loss" costs and extracontractual, tortious bad faith
"judgments
35
liability.

B. A BRIEF TAXONOMY OF REINSURANCE
As reinsurance is a contractual arrangement, the nature, complexity
and terms of many contracts stray from the standardization common among
primary insurance policies.3 6 In fact, because of reinsurance's remarkable
flexibility and its capacity to take on a large variety of risk types and risk
levels, the policies vary in their purposes and specifics.37 The terms of the
reinsurance contract and the terms of the policies reinsured determines the
scope of the indemnity offered by the reinsurer.38 The contracts reflect the
business needs of sophisticated commercial entities and, as such, the terms,
33 PLITT, supra note 9, § 9:24 ("It is the language of the reinsurance contract
that will ultimately determine the extent of the reinsurer's liability to the reinsured.
In other words, the sustaining of a loss by the original insured cannot create
liability for the reinsurer extending beyond the terms of its contract"). See also
STARING, supra note 20, § 15:1, at 1 ("It does not necessarily follow that, where
the first insurer is liable, the reinsurer is also liable. Whether or not the reinsurer is
liable depends upon the terms of the contract of reinsurance.").
34

See PLrrr,supra note 9, § 9:30.

35

See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supranote 10, § 16.06[a], at 1045-1048.

36

See id. § 15.03[b], at 997 ("Reinsurance treaties and certificates vary

considerably in their language and terms of coverage").
37 Id. ("Reinsurance treaties may contain 'follow the fortunes,' 'errors and

omissions,' 'notice,' 'arbitration,' 'claims cooperation,' 'salvage and subrogation,'
'allocation of expenses,' 'extra contractual obligations,' 'punitive damages' and/or
'cut through clauses.' The wording of these clauses in different reinsurance
certificates and treaties can also vary substantially.").
38 See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764, 806-07 (1993).
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conditions and costs of a reinsurance contract are all negotiable.39 Various
clauses such as "follow the forms" and "follow the settlements ' , ° or
clauses for "extracontractual damages '' 1, all discussed later in further
detail, are common to many reinsurance contracts. The interaction of
various clauses and the reciprocal obligations of good faith will be
discussed in Section TV as we review the performance standards required
by the reinsurance agreement. First, in order to understand the purposes of
reinsurance, we review a few of the common types of arrangements
common to those agreements. 42

39 See NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note

8, at

40.01 ("The reinsurance relationship is evidenced by a written contract reflecting
the negotiated terms. Although reinsurance contracts between different cedents
and reinsurers can include clauses with similar purposes, the wording of particular
provisions varies significantly, depending on the parties' specific needs, customs
and practices.").
40

See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supranote 11, at 31 (noting

"'follow the settlements' generally provides that a reinsurer must cover settlements
made by the reinsured in a business like manner, provided the settlement is
arguably within the terms of the reinsured's policy and the reinsurance agreement
and the settlement is not affected by fraud, collusion or bad faith. It is an
expectation that the reinsurer will abide by the reinsured's good faith determination
to settle, rather than litigate, claims under a reinsured policy and not relitigate a
reinsured's settlements ceded to the reinsurance agreement. The term is often used
interchangeably with follow the fortunes, and there may be overlap between the
affect of follow the settlements and follow the fortunes when the 'risk' is what
generated the loss. Follow the settlements is focused on 'loss settlement', not
necessarily tied to a 'risk determination' arising out of follow the fortunes.").
41 Id. at 29 (noting the definition of the term extra-contractual obligations as
"in reinsurance, monetary awards or settlements against an insurer for its alleged
wrongful conduct to its insured. Such payments required of an insurer to its
insured are extra-contractual in that they are not covered in the underlying
contract.").
42

See PLITr, supra note 9, § 9:3 ("There are two broad categories of

reinsurance agreements: facultative reinsurance and treaty reinsurance.").

REINSURANCE: THE SILENT REGULATOR?

2009]

i.

FacultativeReinsurance

Facultative reinsurance is the most discrete form of reinsurance,
and generally accepted as the likely original form of reinsurance.43
Facultative reinsurance policies take their name because the contracts allow
the reinsurance company to use its "faculties" or reason to choose to4
reinsure a specific risk, a specific policy, or a specific group of policies.
The ceding insurer and reinsurer agree to the terms and conditions of each
individual contract.4 5 In these contracts, the reinsurer often conducts its
own underwriting to determine the appropriate premium level.46
Facultative reinsurance contracts provide reinsurance for the unusual; they
also have the greatest specific effect on the cost of covering unusual or

43 See STARING, supra note 20, § 1:4 ("Facultative reinsurance of a single risk,

which was undoubtedly the original type, continued dominant until the last half of
the Nineteenth Century. A treaty, which is a long term contract covering more
than one risk, is known to have existed as early as 1821. Treaties became common
around the beginning of the Twentieth Century and one form, the excess of loss
treaty, is said to have become widespread as a result of the San Francisco
earthquake and fire of 1906").
44 See JERRY supra note 9, § 140[b], at 1054 ("Facultative reinsurance
involves the primary insurer entering into an agreement for the reinsurance of a
particular risk. The reinsurance can be written on a pro rata or an excess basis; the
root word "faculty" denotes that the reinsurer has a choice of accepting or rejecting
any risk proposed and of demanding whatever premium it thinks appropriate.").
45 See NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 8, at §

40.04[1] ("The reinsurer and cedent negotiate the terms for each facultative
certificate."). See also STARING, supra note 20, at §2:2 ("The prospective
reinsured, either directly or through a broker, presents the direct policy terms, or a
summary of them, and the proposal for reinsurance. If it is accepted at a
satisfactory premium, a contract is made. Other terms are negotiated to the
satisfaction ofboth parties.").
46

See

STARING,

supra note 20, § 2:6 ("The reinsurer will always have at least

a general, if not a particular, interest in the integrity of the reinsured's underwriting
and claims practices.").

See also NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE

GUIDE, supranote 8, § 40.04[1] ("Facultative reinsurance is commonly purchased
for large, unusual or catastrophic risks. Reinsurers thus must have the necessary
resources to underwrite individual risks carefully.").
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low-incidence risks.47 Likewise, with its ability to allow reinsurers to
engage in significant underwriting operations prior to placing the policy,
facultative reinsurance is often used to cover catastrophic or other low
incidence - high loss risks.48 Individual risk facultative reinsurance may be
used in
tandem with the second variety of reinsuring agreements, the
49
treaty.

ii.

Treaty Reinsurance

Treaties are broad agreements that reinsure multiple contracts,
often contracts that have yet to be written by the direct insurer.50 Usually,
treaties cover some portion or class of business of the direct insurer and
historically may cover a long period of time, usually renewable on a fairly
automatic basis unless one of the parties seeks a new term. 5' Treaties are
See STARING, supra note 20, § 2:3, at 4 ("Once, no doubt, all reinsurance
was facultative. With the rise of treaties, they account for great amounts of
47

reinsurance but facultative reinsurance, which requires individual attention to
underwriting, remains very important for businesses that fall outside the bounds of

a treaty reinsurance program. The reinsured may want to meet competition and
enter into new lines in which it has no expertise but can gain it through initially
taking risks and obtaining facultative reinsurance from those who have experience.
The reinsured may need facultative reinsurance where the risk falls under an
exclusion in its treaties, either as to type or amount, or because the risk, although

routine in nature, present a very high loss exposure. In the end, all these uses serve
the general purpose of reinsurance to provide stability and promote growth.").
48

See OSTRAGER &NEWMAN, supra note 10, § 15.01[b] ("The availability of

reinsurance enables an insurer to accept risks that would otherwise be beyond its
underwriting capacity by allowing the ceding insurer to 'lay-off on reinsurers a
portion of the risk of loss. Thus, reinsurance enables insurers to spread the risk of
catastrophic losses among a larger pool of insurers.").
See New Appleman Insurance Law Practice Guide, supra note 8, at §
40.04[l].
49

50

JERRY

supra note 9, § 140[b], at 1054.

Id. ("Most reinsurance is treaty reinsurance. The treaty arrangement,
sometimes called "automatic reinsurance," involves a commitment of a reinsurer to
assume part of the risk of the primary insurer, either on a pro rata or an excess
51

basis, for a stated period.").
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particularly useful reinsuring mechanisms since they can be structured to
reinsure losses on direct insurance which either were written during the
term of the treaty but occur later, or they can be structured to reinsure
52
losses that occur during the term of treaty but were written earlier.
Likewise, the premiums may be calculated in a variety of ways including
structuring the reinsurance premium in some way directly related to the
premiums on the underlying policies or assigning a single sum or some
other variable amount as the parties wish and which reflect their business
purposes.53 Generally speaking, the treaty reinsurance contract forms when
the original insurer cedes part of the premiums for its policies and the risk
of losses on those policies to the reinsurer. 54 Treaty reinsurance usually
involves multiple reinsurers taking part of a book of the business' risks,
with each
agreeing to assume a portion of the risk in some pre-determined
55
manner.
Importantly, reinsurance treaties cover all risks written by the
reinsured that fall within their terms unless specifically excluded.56 For this
reason, treaty reinsurers generally do not review the individual risks
underlying the treaty and do not conduct their own underwriting of the
52

See STARING, supranote 20, § 2:4, at 4-5.

Id. at 5 ("Depending again on its structure and purpose, the premiums may
be directly related to the premiums on the underlying insurance or may be lump
sums, or variable amounts, not based on direct participation in the underlying
premiums.").
53

&NEWMAN, supra note 10, § 15.03[a], at 996. ("The reinsurer,
under a single contract, agrees to indemnify the ceding insurer with respect to an
entire 'book' of the ceding insurer's underwriting activities for designated lines of
insurance. A treaty reinsurance contract is formed when the primary insurer cedes
part of the premiums for its policies and the losses on those policies to a
reinsurer.").
54 OSTRAGER

Id. ("Arrangements typically involve the participation of numerous
reinsurers, each agreeing to assume a percentage of the total liability under a single
treaty.").
55

56

See

NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE,

supra note 8, §

40.04, at 17. ("Reinsurance treaties cover all of the risks written by the ceding
insurer that fall within their terms unless exposures are specifically excluded.
Thus, in most cases, neither the cedent nor the reinsurer has the 'faculty' to
exclude from a treaty a risk that fits within the treaty terms.").
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risks.
Rather, they rely on the underwriting experience of the original
insurer, with a prudent reinsurer investigating the underwriting philosophy,
loss experience, attitude towards claims management and other business
practices.58
Facultative reinsurance can be combined with treaty
reinsurance to cover exclusions in the treaty or for other business purposes,
some of which we explore later.59
iii. The Verticals and Horizontals of Reinsurance: ProrataandExcess ofLoss
Again, we recognize along with the United States Supreme Court
that:
In indemnity reinsurance . . . [the reinsurer] agrees to
indemnify, or reimburse, the ceding company for a
specified percentage of the claims and expenses
attributable to claims that have been reinsured.6 °

57

Id. ("Treaty reinsurers rely heavily on the cedent's underwriting.").

supra note 11, at 7. ("While
treaty reinsurance does not require review of individual risks by the reinsurer, it
demands a careful review of the underwriting philosophy, practice and historical
experience of the ceding insurer, including a thoughtful evaluation of the
company's attitude toward claims management, engineering control, as well as the
management's general background, expertise and planned objectives.").
58 REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF

AMERICA,

59 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 29, 54.
(Noting the definition of treaty reinsurance is "is a reinsurance contract under
which the reinsured company agrees to cede and the reinsurer agrees to assume
risks of a particular class or classes of businesses" and the definition of facultative
reinsurance is "reinsurance of individual risks by offer and acceptance wherein the
reinsurer retains the ability to accept or reject each risk offered by the ceding
company.").
60 Colonial American Life Ins. Co. v. Comm'r, 491 U.S. 244, 247 (1989). See

also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 806-07 (1993).
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The insured's indemnification by the reinsured need not be total or
complete. 6' In fact, the ability of reinsurers to take only a portion of a risk
or book of risks is one of the particularly useful risk spreading-elements of
reinsurance.62 There is nothing to prevent a single reinsurer from taking all
indemnity responsibility for a policy or group of policies, but most
reinsuring agreements take responsibility for only a portion of those
losses.63 Traditionally, the responsibilities divide into two basic divisional
structures most easily visualized as either a vertical or horizontal slicing up

61

See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 1

("Reinsurance is a transaction in which one insurance company indemnifies, for a
premium, another insurance company against all or part of the loss that it may
sustain under its policy or policies of insurance").
62

Id. ("The fundamental objective of insurance, to spread the risk so that no

single entity finds itself saddled with a financial burden beyond its ability to pay, is
enhanced by reinsurance."). See also NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE
GUIDE, supra note 8 ("Reinsurance relationships can be simple or complex. A
cedent can cede certain loss exposures under one contract or purchase several
contracts covering different aspects or portions of the same policy to achieve the
desired degree of coverage. A layering process involving two or more reinsurance
agreements is commonly employed to obtain sufficient monetary limits of
reinsurance protection. When a claim is presented, the reinsurers respond in a
predetermined order to cover the loss.").
63

See PLITr, supra note 9, § 9:1, at 3-4 ("Reinsurance is a contract whereby

one insurer transfers or 'cedes' to another insurer all or part of the risk it has
assumed under a separate or distinct policy or group of policies in exchange for a
portion of the premium.").
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of the losses from particular risks assumed. 64 Both facultative and treaty
65
reinsurance can be written in either a pro-rata or excess of loss basis.
C. PRO-RATA AND EXCESS OF Loss

If a reinsurer does not want indemnification responsibility for an
entire risk classification or group of policies, it can structure the treaty to
take on only a specific portion of each risk to which it applies.66 Using a
pro-rata reinsurance contract, the reinsurer agrees to indemnify the ceding
insurer for a percentage of original risk losses in exchange for a
corresponding portion of the premium. 67 Generally, pro-rata agreements
64 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 1
("Reinsurance may be written on either a proportional basis or excess of loss basis.
A reinsurance contract written on a proportional basis simply prorates all
premiums, losses and expenses between the insurer and the reinsurer on a prearranged basis. The proportional approach is used extensively in property
reinsurance. Excess of loss contracts, on the other hand, require the primary
insurer to keep all losses up to a predetermined level of retention, and the reinsurer
to reimburse the company for any losses above that level of retention, up to the
limits of the reinsurance contract. In simplest terms, a retention is analogous to the
deductible a policyholder may have on a personal insurance policy, such as an
automobile or homeowner's policy.").
65

See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10, §15.03[a], at 996 ("Both treaty

reinsurance and facultative reinsurance can be written on either a pro-rata or
excess-of-loss basis. Treaty reinsurance involves an ongoing agreement between
two insurers, binding in advance one to cede and the other to accept specified
business that is the subject of the treaty. Facultative reinsurance is negotiated with
respect to a specific risk insured by a particular policy or policies."). See also
REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supranote 11, at 7..
' See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supranote 11, at 10 ("Under
proportional reinsurance, the ceding insurer and the reinsurer automatically share
all premiums and losses covered by the contract on a pre-agreed basis, thus there
are no characteristics uniquely attributable to the risk associated with proportional
reinsurance.").
67

See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supranote 10, § 15.02[a], at 993 ("Pursuant to

a pro-rata reinsurance contract, the reinsurer agrees to indemnify the ceding insurer
for a percentage of any losses from the original risk in return for a corresponding
portion of the premium for the original risk.").
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obligate the reinsurer to indemnify an insurer without requiring any
retention by the reinsured. 68 Commonly, this type of pro-rata arrangement
is called Quota Share Reinsurance, where the ceding company indemnifies
the cedent insurer for a fixed percentage of loss on all policies of a defined
risk type. 69 This easily visualized apportionment can become somewhat
more complex in that a "pro-rata" treaty can also be horizontally segmented
within each "slice" by requiring the ceding insurer to retain some portion of
the loss with the reinsurer only responsible for the surplus. 70 This type of
pro-rata reinsuring up to the amount of insurance originally written, minus
the ceding insurer's retention is commonly called Surplus Share
Reinsurance.71 With the entrance of additional retrocessionaires there can
be quite a bit of segmentation in this surplus line.
See Ott v. All-Star Ins. Corp., 299 N.W.2d 839, 843 (Wis. 1981); Central
Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Devonshire Coverage Corp., 426 F. Supp. 7, 11 n. 5, 21 (D. Neb.
68

1976), aff'd in part and remanded, 565 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1977). See also
& NEWMAN, supra note 10, § 15.02[a], at 993 ("Pro-rata reinsurance

OSTRAGER

arrangements generally obligate the reinsurer to pay a proportion of any losses that
occur with no retention by the reinsured.").
See JERRY, supra note 9, § 140[b], at 1054-1055 ("Pro rata reinsurance,
sometimes called 'quota share' reinsurance, means that losses, premiums, and
expenses are divided pro rata by the primary insurer and the reinsurer. For
example, the primary insurer may retain sixty percent of the risk and transfer forty
percent. If any loss occurs, whether large or small, the primary insurer is liable for
sixty percent of the loss and the reinsurer is liable for forty percent."). See also
OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10, § 15.02[a], at 993 (noting quota share
reinsurance "indemnifies the ceding insurer for a fixed percentage of loss for all
policies of a defined type written by the ceding company.").
69

9, § 140[b] at 1055. ("A special kind of pro rata
reinsurance is 'surplus reinsurance.' Under surplus reinsurance, the reinsurer
agrees to cover a share of the risk that varies with the size of the exposure. For
example, the treaty might specify that losses under $50,000 are covered in full by
the primary insurer, that the first $50,000 of losses between $50,000 and $250,000
is paid by the direct insurer and the rest by the reinsurer, and that losses exceeding
$250,000 are paid 20 percent by the direct insurer and 80 percent by the
70

JERRY, supra note

reinsurer.").
71 See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10, § 15.02[a], at 993 (noting
surplus share reinsurance "indemnifies the ceding insurer for a fixed percentage of
loss for all policies of a defined type written by the ceding company.").
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Another interesting aspect of pro-rata treaties is the reinsured's
obligation to automatically accept its portion of the risks insured. 72 Prorata treaties come in a variety of broad types, knowledge of each of which
is useful for our later discussion. For instance, the treaty can be pro-rata
and obligatory.73 Through this structure, all risks in a specified category
are shared automatically by some proportion agreed to. 74 Pro-rata treaties
often allocate a portion of the original premium to the reinsurer.75
In the excess of loss reinsurance scenario, the reinsurer's obligation
is defined in relation to the reinsured's retention.76 In this structure the
reinsurer, subject to specific stated limits of coverage, indemnifies the
reinsured for all or a stated portion of losses in excess of the agreed upon
retention. 77 The agreements can be structured so that the reinsurance can

72

See NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 8,

§

40.04[2], at 16 ("Proportional or pro-rata reinsurance is characterized by a
proportional division of liability and premium between the ceding company and
the reinsurer.").
Id. ("The cedent pays the reinsurer a predetermined share of the premium,
and the reinsurer indemnifies the cedent for a like share of the loss and the expense
incurred by the cedent in its defense and settlement of claims (the 'allocated loss
adjustment expense' or 'LAE').
73

74 Id. ("According to the percentage agreed, the cedent and reinsurer share the
premium and losses from the business reinsured.").
75 See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10, § 15.02[a], at 993 ("Pursuant to
a pro-rata reinsurance contract, the reinsurer agrees to indemnify the ceding insurer
for a percentage of any losses from the original risk in return for a corresponding
portion of the premium for the original risk. Pro-rata reinsurance arrangements
generally obligate the reinsurer to pay a proportion of any losses that occur with no
retention by the reinsured.").

See STARING, supra note 20, at 4 ("Whether the contract is pro rata or
excess, the reinsured will.. .be expected ordinarily to retain a sufficient amount of
the risk to give the reinsurer confidence that the policy will be well
administered.").
76

See Compagnie de Reassurance d'Ile de France v. New England
Reinsurance Corp., 944 F. Supp. 986, 998 n.17 (D. Mass. 1996).
77
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be excess to the specific risk, specific occurrence, an aggregate dollar
amount or specified loss ratio. 78
Ill.

PURPOSES OF REINSURANCE

A comprehensive review of all the reasons an insurer may seek to
reinsure is not possible or necessary for the purposes of this Essay. Suffice
it to say that as reinsurance is a flexible medium and supports a variety of
functions, the purpose of acquiring it will differ in accordance with the
business interests of the insurer seeking it.79 Likewise, as reinsurance
serves a variety of purely financial and accounting purposes, reinsurance
may be employed for purposes slightly beyond the scope of this Essay's
interest in its potential regulatory effects on insurance companies as
insuring companies, rather than as financial institutions. Regardless, in
accordance with our focus on the potential effects of reinsurance on
primary insurers, it is useful to review the four main purposes for which
reinsurance is generally
sought in relation to the primary insurer's
80
insurance function.

OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, § 15.02[b], at 994 (noting per risk or specific excess
reinsurance "indemnifies the ceding insurer, subject to a specified limit, against the
amount of loss in excess of a specified retention with respect to each risk covered
by a reinsurance arrangement"; per occurrence reinsurance "indemnifies the ceding
insurer, subject to a specified limit, against the amount of loss in excess of a
specified retention with respect to each occurrence"; aggregate excess of loss
reinsurance "indemnifies the ceding insurer for the amount by which the ceding
insurer's loss during a specified period exceeds either (a) a specific dollar amount
78

or (b) a percentage of the company's subject premium"; and stop loss reinsurance
"indemnifies the ceding insurer for losses in excess of a specified loss ratio up to a
predetermined loss ratio limit.").
79 See REINSURANCE

ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA,

supra note 11, at 3
("Depending on the ceding company's goals, different types of reinsurance
contracts are available to bring about the desired result.").

Id. (Insurers purchase reinsurance for essentially four reasons: (1) to limit
liability on specific risks; (2) to stabilize loss experience; (3) to protect against
catastrophes; and (4) to increase capacity.").
80
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A. RISK ALLOCATION
For some purposes, reinsurance serves the almost identical purpose
for the reinsured insurance company as that of many other common
commercial insurances. Thus, reinsurance's initial purpose may be viewed
as a basic reallocation of risk and as an additional way to spread risk. 81 Just

as any commercial entity might enter the insurance market seeking
indemnity for specific types of loss, so too does the insurer seek a
mechanism to transfer the risk it chose to underwrite to another party. 2 In
a reinsurance situation, the risk acquired by the ceding insurer transfers to
the reinsurer to the extent and within the limits of the negotiated contract;
to the extent that those risks are allocated among numerous reinsurers, the
risk is spread even further. 83
This risk transfer benefits the insurer by allowing the reinsured to
take action that might otherwise be prohibited or disallowed sans
reinsurance. 84 For instance, through the medium of reinsurance, the ceding
81

Id. ("By providing a mechanism through which insurers limit their loss

exposure to levels commensurate with their net assets, reinsurance enables
insurance companies to offer coverage limits considerably higher than they could
otherwise provide.").
82

Kemper Reins. Co. v. Corcora (In re Midland Ins. Co.), 590 N.E.2d 1186,

1188 (1992).
83 REINSURANCE

ASSOCIATION OF

AMERICA,

supranote 11, at 6. Importantly,

it must be remembered that reinsurance does not actually lessen total risk
exposure:
In any discussion of reinsurance, the limitations must be
considered along with its advantages. Reinsurance does not
change the inherent nature of a risk being insured. It cannot make
a bad risk insurable or an exposure more predictable or desirable.
And while reinsurance may limit an insurance company's exposure
to a risk, the total risk exposure is not altered through the use of
reinsurance.
Id.
84 JERRY, supra note 9, § 141, at 1056 ("[R]einsurance permits an insurer to
transfer large risks that it is unable to manage or that are simply too risky to
another insurer.").
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insurer can underwrite business that it might otherwise not have been able
to undertake.8 5 Either the risk itself may simply be too large or the risk of
loss might be unusual in some other way.8 6 By limiting their loss exposure
through reinsurance, the reinsured can offer higher coverage limits than
they could otherwise afford. 7 Through this mechanism, smaller insurers
have the capacity to compete with larger companies and offer their
policyholders a broader array of coverage options. 88
Likewise, the insurer may want to enter business lines that present
the possibility of some future unexpected losses the insurer is unwilling to
retain beyond a specific retention.8 9 Either the possibility of a very great a
Id. ("For example, an insurer that has a portfolio of coverage faces the risk
that a large number of small losses of an unexpected, unexceptional nature may
occur, thereby exceeding the insurer's capacity to pay for them without suffering a
loss.").
85

Id. ("[Tihe insurer faces the risk that a single catastrophic event, the precise
timing of which is uncertain (e.g., an earthquake) may occur with devastating
consequences to the insurer's balance sheet.").
86

87 REINSURANCE

ASSOCIATION OF

AMERICA,

supra note 11, at 3 ("In

calculating an appropriate level of reinsurance, a company takes into account the
amounts of its own available surplus, and determines its level of retention based on

the amount of loss it can absorb financially. Surplus, sometimes referred to as
policyholders' surplus, is the amount by which the assets of an insurer exceed its
liabilities. A company's retention may range anywhere from a few thousand
dollars to one million dollars or more. The loss exposure above the retention, up to
the policy limits of the reinsurance contract, is indemnified by the reinsurer. In
this manner, reinsurance helps to stabilize loss experience on individual risks, as
well as on accumulated losses under many policies occurring during a specified
period.").
88

Id. (noting reinsurance's goal of limiting liability "is crucial because it

allows all companies, large and small, to offer coverage limits to meet their
policyholders' needs. In this manner, reinsurance provides an avenue for small-tomedium size companies to compete with industry giants.").
89 JERRY,

supra note 9, at § 141, at 1056-57 ("Just as reinsurance enables an

insurer to take on new business, reinsurance can also be used to enable an insurer
to leave a particular kind of business quickly. An insurer that wants to rid itself of
a particular kind of coverage can solicit reinsurance for all of the insurance the
carrier has written, which effectively takes the insurer out of the business and
makes the reinsurer the insurer for all ofthe risks.").
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number of small, unexpected losses or the possibility of a single,
catastrophic loss which could overwhelm the insurer's balance sheet might
cause a prudent insurer to acquire reinsurance to offset the risk of loss.90
This prudential risk-transferring purpose of reinsurance appropriately
supports a decision to reinsure, even though the insurer believes (as it must)
that its underwriting decisions are prudent and the premium appropriate.
After all, sufficiently imprudent underwriting could well be a defense to
reinsurance coverage. 9' Still, even the most perspicacious of underwriters
cannot foresee the unexpected; thus the prudential purpose of reinsurance.

90 Id. at 1056 ("When the primary insurer purchases reinsurance, it reduces the
size of its potential losses, which reduces the size ofthe reserves it must maintain.
Insurers, however, are not as interested in reducing reserves as they are in
increasing their business. An insurer with the minimum allowable level of reserves
and surplus (the amount an insurer is required to maintain in excess of reserves to
meet unexpected losses) could not take on new business or enter new fields.
However, reinsurance provides a solution: the insurer could write the coverage,
transfer the risk to a reinsurer, and receive a commission from the reinsurer. The
primary insurer adds no new liabilities, but its surplus increases by the amount of
the commission. This increased surplus enables the primary insurer to write and
retain additional coverage. Another way to view this transaction is that some of
the excess capacity of the reinsurer is utilized by the business-garnering efforts of
the primary insurer; in essence some excess capacity is transferred from the
reinsurer to the primary insurer. For the small insurer who wants to grow,
reinsurance is an important way to take on new business beyond its means and
simultaneously increase its capacity.").
91 PLITT, supra note 9, at § 9:31, 80-1 ("The duty of good faith that runs
between the parties to a reinsurance contract is essential to the reinsurance
relationship. Stemming from the reinsurer's need to rely upon and not duplicate the

reinsured's efforts in properly evaluating risks and handling claims, and reducing
costs for both parties to the reinsurance contract. Due to these specific needs of the
industry, the duty of utmost good faith in this context connotes a higher duty than
the ordinary duty of good faith that is inherent in general contract law.
Accordingly, it requires that the reinsured must disclose to the reinsurer all
material facts which may affect the subject risk. The failure of a reinsured to
disclose material facts to the reinsurer will warrant the rescission of a reinsurance
contract.").
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B. RESERVE REQUIREMENTS

A second purpose for reinsurance, one particularly importantly in
the insurance regulatory context, is using reinsurance to reduce the amount
of reserves an insurer must maintain, thus freeing the insurer up to write
more policies.92 In purchasing reinsurance, the primary insurer reduces the
size of its potential losses, which allows it to reduce its statutorily
mandated reserves. 93 Hence, if a primary insurer hits the threshold for the
minimum allowable level of reserves plus surplus that it is statutorily
required to maintain, the amount of new business open to it would be
restricted. But, if the primary insurer purchased reinsurance, the primary
would still be able to write new policies so long as it could transfer the risk
to the reinsurer.94 In fact, since the reinsurer swaps the new risk in
exchange for a commission, the primary insurer is frequently seen as
acquiring no new liabilities, while its surplus is viewed as increasing by the
amount of the reinsurer's commission.9 5 The majority of public regulation
governing reinsurers concerns itself with this aspect of the reinsuring
relationship.9 6
92

See Kemper Reins. Co. v. Corcoran (In re Midland Ins. Co.), 79 N.Y.2d

255, 258 (1992) (noting reinsurance allows "a primary insurer to reduce the
amount of legally required reserves held for the protection of policyholders, and to
increase the company's ability to underwrite other policies or make other
investments").
93 See STARING, supra note 20 ("For the individual insurer, the purchase of

reinsurance has any or all of a number of objectives. It will desire to limit the
reserves it must maintain for losses on its ordinary business.").
94 REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supranote 11, at 4-5 ("When an
insurance company issues a policy, the expenses associated with issuing that
policy, such as taxes, agent commissions, and administrative expenses, are charged
immediately against the company's income, resulting in a decrease in surplus.
Meanwhile, the premium collected must be set aside in an unearned premium
reserve to be recognized as income over a period of time. This accounting
procedure allows for strong solvency regulation; however, it ultimately leads to
decreased capacity. As an insurance company sells more policies, it must pay
more expenses from its surplus. Therefore, the company's ability to write
additional business is reduced.").
95

Id. ("Insurers purchase reinsurance... to increase capacity.").
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i. Regulationof Reinsurancefor PurposesofSolvency
Though by no means its sole purpose, much insurance regulation
exists simply to decrease the likelihood of unexpected insurance company
failure. Regulators typically identify the fiscal ramifications of wide-scale
insurance failure as their justification for proper insurance regulation.
Therefore, though permitting reinsurers to go unregulated in other aspects,
regulators recognized that the potential insolvency of a reinsurer could
affect the solvency of its reinsureds, and have therefore taken legislative
action to minimize that risk.
This is no idle matter. Both the Transit Casualty Company and
Mission Insurance Company failed due to insurance insolvency in the
1980'S. 97 The failure occurred in part because they could not collect from
their reinsurers. To address this risk, the states all have various techniques
in place to assure reinsurer solvency. If admitted or licensed in the state,
the reinsurer must comport with certain reserve requirements of its own or,
if foreign or unadmitted, states require the reinsurer to offer a bond
sufficient to allay fears of not collecting on reinsurance agreements. 98 If
the company does not post a bond, the insurer cannot take advantage of
reinsurance's ability to grant credit and expand reserves.
Since reserves are the primary way public regulators attempt to reduce the
risk of insurer insolvency and default, a great amount of activity has occurred
amongst and between regulators to devise statutory schemes that allow for
protection of the reserves. See, e.g., INVESTMENTS OF INSURERS MODEL ACT § 22
(NAIC 2007). There has been some very interesting work on reinsurer chartering
and on bonding requirements for foreign insurers reinsuring domestic primaries.
96

97 U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Insurance Regulation: State Reinsurance
Oversight Increased, but Problems Remain 8 (1990). [Hereinafter 1990 GAO
Report].

98 REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 13 ("When

overriding public policy concerns require regulatory involvement, however, nearly
all states have adopted regulations affecting reinsurance contracts. An example of
this type of regulatory involvement is the requirement of a standard insolvency
clause, which allows the receiver of an insolvent insurer to collect on reinsurance
contracts. While few states require the filing or approval of reinsurance contracts,
indirect regulation of reinsurance contracts and rates does exist. For example,
restrictions on insurance rates affect reinsurance rates. Generally, if the amount
paid in the premium to the insurer is limited, the amount of premium paid under a
quota share reinsurance contract may also be limited.").
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Still, the multi-state system leads to some fears of inadequacy and
redundancy. To address these issues, along with the perennial problem of
construing the appropriate way for the states to share in the taxation of
these transactions, the House of Representatives in June 2007 passed HR
1065, the Nonadmitted and Reinsurance Reform Act. 99 The Senate
That
companion bill, S 929, awaits consideration in the Senate.''
legislation would create a single state authority to determine the
appropriateness of reinsurance credit and reinsurer solvency assessment.10 l
The solvency assessment would be conducted by the reinsurer's home state
and the credit determination would be made solely by the ceding insurer's
domiciliary state. 10 2 It is unclear how this alters the current regulatory
system other than to encourage reinsurers or insurers to change their
domiciles in search of a state whose regulation best comports with their
needs, though it likely will assist in clarifying taxation. In any event, these
Congressional efforts reflect an understanding of reinsurance's direct effect
on insurer's solvency.
By this legislative activity, it is apparent the regulators are not
entirely unaware of the financial effects a reinsurer default could have on
reinsureds. Yet, this type of legislation is still limited to regulation of
reinsurance only as a source of funds for the domestic insurer. Basically, it
reflects a conceptualization of reinsurance as a mere contractually acquired
source of capital. There is no attempt in the regulatory legislation to move
beyond solvency and to address the effects the terms a reinsurance
agreement may have on their reinsured's performance as regards their
underlying policyholders. So far as regulators appear concerned, their
responsibility to regulate reinsurance ends with regulating solvency.

99 National Association of Insurance Commisioners, Current Issues:
Nonadmitted Insurance and Reinsurance, http://www.naic.org/topics/topic_
surplus lines.html (last visited February 19, 2009).
1oo Id. (That legislation would grant exclusive regulatory authority for multistate surplus lines and to the insured's home state so as to restrict each transaction
to a single set of regulatory oversight, rules and taxation).
01Id.
102

id.
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C. RISK EXITS AND FRONTING
A third commonly accepted purpose of reinsurance allows the
primary insurer to cease writing some policies.'13 An insurer that seeks to
exit a certain risk stream can be relieved of the risks of loss from those
policies and exit that insurance market via appropriate reinsurance. 1°4 This
allows a certain amount of flexibility to insurers
by allowing them to shift
05
direction in their future business choices.
A few caveats are necessary here. By reinsuring the entire loss, the
primary insurer generally has not freed itself from its direct responsibilities
to its policyholders, despite even a 100% risk transfer to the reinsuring
companies. In other words, though it may have successfully transferred the
risks of loss, it did not transfer its servicing responsibilities to the reinsurer.
Again, reinsurance is generally defined as a secondary indemnity
agreement and the reinsurer does not usually assume a direct claims
handling relationship with the policyholders of the reinsured. 10 6 Reinsuring
agreements can, however, include "cut-out" provisions, which allow a
direct action by the policyholders against
the reinsurer; provisions like
10 7
these change the reinsuring relationship.
supra note 9, § 140[a], at 1056-57 ("Just as reinsurance enables an
insurer to take on new business, reinsurance can also be used to enable an insurer
to leave a particular kind of business quickly. An insurer that wants to rid itself of
103 JERRY,

a particular kind of coverage can solicit reinsurance for all of the insurance the
carrier has written, which effectively takes the insurer out of the business and
makes
the reinsurer the insurer for all of the risks.").
104
id

105 id.
106 NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE,

supra note 8, at §

40.01 ("In essence, reinsurance is insurance for insurance companies. It is a
contractual arrangement under which an insurer secures coverage from a reinsurer
for a potential loss to which it is exposed under insurance policies issued to
original insureds. The risk indemnified against is the risk that the insurer will have
to pay on the underlying insured risk. Because reinsurance is a contract of
indemnity, absent specific cash-call provisions, the reinsurer is not required to pay
under the contract until after the original insurer has paid a loss to its original

insured.").
'07 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 27 (noting

the definition of the term 'cut-through endorsement' as "an endorsement to an
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One benefit of the reinsurer's role instead of the primary insurer
role is that the reinsurer is generally free from direct original policyholder
action. For this reason, the standards of contract performance and the
mutual obligations of the reinsured and reinsurer differ in type and
structure from that of policyholder and insurer. Some of these relationships
and the differences of obligations are described in Section IV of this Essay.
Too much direct interaction by the reinsurer and the original policyholder
will force the reinsurer to be treated simply as an insurer of the
policyholder, obviating some of the benefits and performance obligations
associated with the reinsuring agreement, usually to the reinsurer's
detriment. Likewise, though there is nothing to prevent the kind of direct
assumption of the primary insurer's role, such a situation really is better
understood as a novation of the original primary insurance policies, rather
than the type of reinsurance agreement for business agility that is the more
common purpose of seeking reinsurance for indemnity purposes.
Another brief caveat is also useful here. Placing reinsurance for
100% of a certain type of underwriting business for the purpose of exiting
the business is likewise different from another type of 100% reinsuring
In "fronting
agreement that displays certain similar characteristics.
agreements", an insurer will enter into a policy with the understanding that
another party, a reinsurer, will be responsible for the entire amount that it is
required to pay under the policy. I08 One New York court described a
fronting agreement or "fronting cessation" as an arrangement where an
insurer issues a policy on a risk "with an understanding that another party
will insure it".'0 9 The purpose of these "fronting agreements" is to allow a
reinsurer not qualified or licensed to do business in the state, the

insurance policy or reinsurance contract which provides that, in the event of the
insolvency of the insurance company, the amount of any loss which would have
been recovered from the reinsurer by the insurance company (or its statutory
receiver) will be paid instead directly to the policyholder, claimant, or other payee,
as specified by the endorsement, by the reinsurer.").
108
See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Shriver, Inc., 224 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2000)
(describing a fronting agreement as a "well established ad perfectly legal scheme"
where policies are issued by state-licensed insurance companies and then
immediately reinsured to 100 percent of face value).
109
Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Excess Ins. Co., 970 F. Supp. 265, 267 n.2
(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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opportunity to profit from the sale of insurance transactions in that state." 0
Generally, the licensed insurer will receive a fee for acting as the "front"."'
Despite the slightly pejorative terms used in this arrangement, there is
nothing illegal in a domestic insurer acting as a front for the unauthorized
insurer. In fact, so long as all other regulatory goals are met, these
relationships can allow for a significant increase in insurance capacity. 112
D. Loss STABILITY
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, reinsurance is a mechanism
for insurers to stabilize their profits and expected losses.13 Insurance does
and always has concerned risk.'1 4 Using reinsurance, the primary insurer
can set a limit on its exposure by facultative insurance for any given risk,
use a surplus treaty to create a ceiling on aggregate loss or determine its
percentage of risk retained through a pro-rata arrangement.'5 In this way,

110
See

Union Sav. Am. Life Ins. Co. v. North Central Life Ins. Co., 813 F.

Supp. 481, 484 (S. D. Miss. 1993).
"11

See Venetsanos v. Zucker, Facher & Zucker, 638 A.2d 1333, 1336 (N.J.

Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
112

NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 8, at §

40.04[5] ("A licensed reinsurer can front for an unauthorized reinsurer or a
reinsurance syndicate, to permit the ceding insurer to take credit for the reinsurance

without need for security.").
113JERRY, supra note 9, § 140[a], at 1057 ("A fourth purpose of reinsurance is
to stabilize insurers' profits and losses.").
114See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supranote 11, at
49 (noting
the definition of the term 'risk' as "a term which defines uncertainty of loss,
chance of loss, or the variance of actual from expected results as it relates to
coverage provided under an insurance or reinsurance contract. Also the term is
used to identify the object of insurance protection, e.g., a building, an automobile,
a human life, or exposure to liability. In reinsurance, each ceding company
customarily makes its own rules for defining a risk.").
115REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 4 ("Insurers
often seeks to reduce the wide swings in profits and loss margins inherent to the
insurance business. These fluctuations result, in part, from the unique nature of
insurance, which involves pricing a product whose actual cost will not be known
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even cumulative losses can be restricted to designated limits. 116 The
insurer uses reinsurance as a form of stability control, enabling them to
fulfill their obligations to policyholders in a continuous manner" 7 and
potentially stabilize their profits. 8
REINSURANCE AS PRIVATE REGULATOR

IV.

As we have seen, reinsurance is a flexible and multifunctional
arrangement. If the benefits of reinsurance to insurers were not so
attractive, this multinational, trillion dollar industry would not be nearly
such a popular choice of insurers. Yet, the potential for reinsurance to
affect the business conduct of insurers has not been among insurance

regulatory concerns. This is likely because reinsurance is considered to
consist of agreements between sufficiently sophisticated parties so as to
require little formal regulatory oversight of the relationship.
That
conclusion, however, precludes the understanding that through the medium
of contracting for reinsurance, the insurer subjects itself to limitations - a
kind of private legislation- similar to that of a consumer policyholder with
its insurer. Just as with primary insurance, the existence of a reinsurance
agreement limits the options of insurer action if they wish to benefit from
the reinsuring agreement.
until sometime inthe future. Through reinsurance, insurers can reduce these
fluctuations in loss experience, and stabilize the company's overall operating
results.").
116

JERRY, supra note 9, § 140[a], at 1057 ("Through reinsurance, the

maximum losses on policies can be kept to manageable levels, and cumulative
losses over a period oftime can be kept within a designated limit.").
117 Corcoran v. Universal Reins. Corp., 713 F. Supp. 77, 82
(S.D.N.Y. 1989)
("Insurance companies depend upon reinsurance contracts for financial stability
and hence their ability to fulfill their obligations under their policies.").

118 REINSURANCE

ASSOCIATION

OF

AMERICA, supranote 11, at 4 ("Insurers

often seek to reduce the wide swings in profit and loss margins inherent to the
insurance business. These fluctuations result, in part, from the unique nature of
insurance, which involves pricing a product whose actual cost will not be known
until sometime in the future. Through reinsurance, insurers can reduce these
fluctuations in loss experience, and stabilize the company's overall results.").
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This is so because the reinsurance agreement is not one without
conditions.
Those conditions include everything from offering the
reinsurer access to its underwriting philosophy 19 and underwriting success
rates, to providing defenses to reinsurance performance based on
inadequate claims handling. Moreover, the sheer breadth of the advantages
available to an insurer from reinsurance make it likely that a prudent
insurer will keep in mind the requirements and interests of the reinsurance
industry while setting its underwriting and claims handling mechanisms in
place. 120 Just like a consumer policyholder will seek to keep his losses
down to attract lower cost insurance, so will an insurer strive to make itself
attractive to reinsurers.
Importantly, it must be recognized that reinsurance is generally not
a one-off deal. Rather, reinsurance agreements are entered into for a
specific time and are often then renegotiated.12 ' When a party is aware that
its conduct under one agreement will affect the terms of its next agreement,
it can only be assumed that the party will seek to mitigate activities which
could have a future negative financial effect. If one can agree on nothing
else as regards the insurance industry, the capacity for these companies to
consider their long term financial interests should be somewhat obvious.
Another aspect of this discussion is not just that insurers seek to
make themselves fiscally attractive risks to their reinsurers, an activity that
119 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supranote 11, at 57 (noting
the definition of underwriting capacity as "[t]he maximum amount of money an
insurer or reinsurer is willing to risk in a single loss event on a single risk or in a
given period. The limit of capacity for an insurer or reinsurer that may also be
imposed by law or regulatory authority.").
120

See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 3 (noting

"[i]nsurers purchase reinsurance for essentially four reasons: (1) to limit liability
on specific risks; (2)

to stabilize loss experience;

(3)

to protect against

catastrophes; and (4) to increase capacity. Depending on the ceding company's
goals, different types of reinsurance contracts are available to bring about the
desired result.").
121 See

REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supranote 11, at 13 (noting
"reinsurance contracts must be shaped to the ceding insurer's unique requirements.
No two contracts are alike - all have marked variations in retention levels,
coverages and exclusions. An insurance company's needs for reinsurance depend
on its book of business and financial and underwriting strategies. The reinsurance
contract, and hence reinsurance premiums, must be individually tailored and
determined by the parties.").
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any party seeking capital would undertake. Rather it is the identification
that terms and standards common to the reinsurance relationship have the
potential to affect insurance company action as regards their primary
policyholder in areas that come within the bounds of current insurance
regulatory interests. Specifically, insurer practices in underwriting and
claims handling.
A. A BRIEF LOOK AT INSURANCE REGULATORY GOALS: THE
22
IDEA OF "AEQUUM ET BoNuM".1

Insurance regulation seeks to achieve a complex set of goals
through the regulation of insurance. Regulation, as discussed earlier,
frequently concerns itself with issues of insurer solvency.' 23 This interest is
not conceived of solely as an attempt to keep a lucrative industry
functioning. Rather, insurer solvency regulation exists in large part to
obviate the harm to insured policyholders who would be hurt as a result the
insurer's insolvency. 24 Unlike many other types of transactions, insurance
does not lend itself to being the type of product that can be replaced if,just
as a policyholder should come to need the insurer to perform, the
policyholder were to learn that its company has defaulted as a result of
insolvency. Put even more plainly, if insufficient reserves cause an insurer
to default as a result of too many claims being made, in a catastrophe
scenario for example,
the negative externalities of that default are
25
extreme.'
potentially
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1383 (8th ed. 2004) (noting the term
secundum aequum et bonum means "[a]ccording to what is just and good.").
122

123 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supranote 11, at 13 (noting
"reinsurance regulation focuses on solvency.").

See STARING, supranote 20, § 19, at 19-1(noting "[r]einsurance has certain
advantages which accrue to the insured public as well.. .reinsurance coverage
represents an added shield protecting a policyholder against uncompensated loss.
This advantage to the insureds is realized most obviously in the event of the
primary insurer's insolvency. "Thus, from the perspective of an insured or
policyholder, the insolvency of the primary insurer may make any reinsurance the
only or de facto source of at least partial compensation for losses incurred.").
124

125

See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION

OF AMERICA,

supra note 11, at 4 (noting

"[r]einsurance provides protection against catastrophic loss in much the same way
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Solvency, however, is not the only goal of insurance regulation.
Rather the mission of insurance regulators is also to assure consumers of
fair treatment and protection from unfair trade practices. 12 6 Fairness can be
seen to include appropriate access to insurance and the prevention of
impermissible discriminatory practices and other notions of consumer
protection. Taken as a whole, this amorphous "public policy" regulatory
interest has perhaps been best characterized by some27 academics as the
insurance regulatory principle of "Aequum et Bonum".1
Used to encompass a spectrum of "public good" regulatory
objectives, the identification of this principle is a useful shorthand. These
"public good" regulatory goals are translated into regulatory policy in a
it helps stabilize an insurer's loss experience. Insurers use reinsurance to protect
against catastrophes in two ways. First, reinsurance protects against catastrophic
financial loss resulting from a single event, such as the total fire loss of a large
manufacturing plant. Second, reinsurance also protects against the aggregation of
many smaller claims resulting from a single event, such as an earthquake or major
hurricane, that affects many policyholders simultaneously. While the insurer is
able to cover losses individually, the aggregate may be more than the insurer
wishes to retain.").
126Insurance

regulatory interests include the perennial issues of risk
containment and default. However, risk of default is not the sole purview of
insurance regulation. Included in regulatory efforts are issues of political interest,
such as guaranteeing equitable access to insurance, and other redistributive and
equitable normative policies. For example, the Connection Department of
Insurance describes its mission as follows:
The mission of the Connecticut Insurance Department is to serve
consumers in a professional and timely manner by providing
assistance and information to the public and to policy makers, by
regulating the insurance industry in a fair and efficient
manner which promotes a competitive and financially sound
insurance market for consumers, and by enforcing the insurance
laws to ensure that consumers are treated fairly and are protected
from unfair practices.
Connecticut
Insurance
Department:
Our
Mission
Statement,
http://www.ct.gov/cid/cwp/view.asp?q=254396.
See Howell E. Jackson & Edward L. Symons Jr., Regulation of Financial
Institutions 452 (1998).
127
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variety of ways and it has not escaped notice that "the objective of aequum
et bonum is present in some degree to most systems of insurance law and
regulation. It has many facets: It is equality. It is morality. It is fairness,
equality, reasonableness.
It may even be efficiency, economy,
128
parsimony."'
Generally this principle is reflected in the tripartite goals that rates
not be "excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory", the standard
language in nearly every state's regulatory legislation. 21 9 Likewise
regulations prohibiting unfair trade practices in the handling of a claim are
created in the interest of consumer protection and fairness. 13 0 This can be
seen to reflect a somewhat disjointed effort to stay true to the "public
interest" as best as it can be defined by regulators and courts while at the
same time offering a private industry an opportunity for profit in an
industry demanding regulated solvency. For this reason, underwriting
practices, the assignment of rates to the sale of insurance, and its corollary
- claims handling - are within the purview of insurance regulatory
interest. '3
In their regulatory efforts Insurance Commissioners have not
apparently considered the potential effect reinsurance agreements could
have on insurers performance of their obligations to their policyholders, nor
does there appear to have been any systemic review of the public policy
12 8
129

id.
This authorization for regulatory efforts in these identifiably somewhat

conflicting and unclear goals is supported by the long standing identification of
insurance as something other than a purely private contractual affair. As courts
have long noted, "It is no longer open to question that the business of insurance is
affected with a public interest... Neither the company nor a policyholder has the
inviolate rights that characterize private contracts." Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 74 P.2d 761, 774 (Cal. 1937). Thus, "[t]he contract of the policyholder is
subject to the reasonable exercise of the state's police power." Id. at 774-75.
130

See National Association of Insurance Commissioners, supra note 13

(noting the NAIC works in conjunction with state insurance regulators in serving
the public interest and facilitating "the fair and equitable treatment of insurance
consumers.").
131

See id. (noting fundamental insurance regulatory goals include protecting

the public interest, promoting competitive markets, promoting the reliability,
solvency, and financial solidity of insurance institutions, and supporting and
improving state regulation of insurance.").
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concerns implicated by the availability of reinsurance for coverage of badfaith extracontractual damages 132 as a matter of consumer protection. In
the next sections, we will identify how the core principle of reinsurance
agreements- the reciprocal duty of good faith- when taken in concert with
other common reinsurance doctrines and practices, have the capability of
influencing insurer behavior on an industry wide scale. Likewise, we will
review how the court's interpretation of these obligations have the potential
to affect insurance claims handling decisions and practices. Finally, we
will review a series of available reinsurance clauses that seem to be
antithetical to consumer protection goals and reduction of coverage
litigation.
B. GOOD FAITH As A REGULATOR OF UNDERWRITING AND
CLAIMS HANDLING PRACTICES

Reinsurance obligates the parties to act in good faith.' 33 In fact, in
can be said that this duty of good faith - enforced by the courts- is the core
principle by which reinsurance operates in its myriad forms. 134
132

See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supranote 11, at 29 (noting

the definition of extra-contractual obligations as "monetary awards or settlements
against an insurer for its alleged wrongful conduct to its insured. Such payments
required of an insurer to its insured are extra-contractual in that they are not
covered in the underlying contract.").
133

See PLITr, supra note 9, §9:17, at 56-57 (noting "[d]uties of good faith and

fair dealing run between the reinsurer and the reinsured much as they do between
the initial insured and his or her insurer. This duty originates from the reinsurer's
need to rely upon and not duplicate the reinsured's efforts in properly evaluating
risks and handling claims, reducing costs for both parties to the reinsurance
contract. Accordingly, this duty requires the reinsured to disclose to the reinsurer
all material facts which may affect the subject risk.").
134 See STARING, supranote 20, § 12:1, at 1-2 ("The long and well established
tradition that reinsurance transactions are a matter of 'utmost good faith' between
the parties has had a predictable effect on the preparation of reinsurance
contracts... The typical reinsurance contract is a relatively short, concise document,
noticeably lacking in the legalisms so characteristic of other types of contracts.
This underlying assumption of utmost good faith allows the companies to draft a
document that assumes both parties are so knowledgeable on the subject matter to
be dealt with and possess such a degree of sophistication as to preclude the
necessity got long, expository declarations of intent and implementation.").
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Importantly, courts reviewing this doctrine have often interpreted it to
require specific insurance company behavior as a condition precedent to
requiring reinsurer performance of its indemnity obligation.' 35 Hence,
failure to act in good faith affords the reinsurer a defense to its reinsurance
obligation.'3 6 Since reinsurance is frequently only triggered by extremely
large dollar value claims, preventing the release of its reinsurer for a lack of
good faith behavior will undoubtedly be of paramount concern to a prudent
insurance company.
i. The Duty of GoodFaith in Underwriting
One of the strangest aspects of reinsurance is the often overlooked
question of how reinsurance could ever exist without becoming cost
prohibitive. If one were to simply think about reinsurance in terms of risk
assessment, there seems little way that the addition of multiple new players
in the insuring process would not add and continue adding to the cost of
insurance. After all, due diligence is an expensive proposition. How could
all these different reinsurance institutions capably evaluate the true risks of
all the policies which they agree to reinsure, particularly in the treaty
context, without accruing costs as large as, if not larger than, the original
insurer? 137 The answer is simply that in the reinsurance treaty context they
simply do not engage in that kind of investigation, instead they rely on the
underwriting skills of their reinsureds. 38 Investigation costs are limited to

35See

e.g. Liquidation of Union Indemn. Ins. Co. v. Am. Centennial Ins. Co.,

674 N.E.2d 313, 319-20 (N.Y. 1996).
136 See JERRY, supra note 9, § 142[c], at 1059 ("The primary insurer and
reinsurer have a duty to deal with each other in good faith, and the reinsurer will
have available to it the defense of misrepresentation, breach of warranty, fraud, or
concealment in circumstances where the primary insurer's acts or neglect give rise
to the defense.").
137 See PLrrr, supra note 9, § 9:17, at 56-57 ("Duties of good faith and fair
dealing run between the reinsurer and the reinsured much as they do between the
initial insured and his or her insurer. This duty originates from the reinsurer's need
to rely upon and not duplicate the reinsured's efforts in properly evaluating risks
and handling claims, reducing costs for both parties to the reinsurance contract.").
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delving into the potential reinsured's
loss experiences, underwriting skills
139
and claims handling competence.
How is action like that considered prudent? As we have seen to
our great dismay in the sub-prime mortgage crisis, the consequences of
opaque risk acquisition can be remarkably severe. In reinsurance, the
reciprocal obligations of good faith obviates this problem in the reinsurance
context. 140 In reinsurance, this duty often requires, "the most abundant
good faith; absolute and perfect candor or openness and honesty;
[including] the absence of any concealment or deception, however
slight". 14 1 Viewing utmost good faith as appropriately sufficient to govern

trillions of dollars of transactions is interesting in and of itself, yet, as the
§ 2:6, at 7 ("The reinsurer will always have at
least a general, if not a particular, interest in the integrity of the reinsured's
underwriting and claims practices.").
138

See STARING, supra note 20,

139

id.

140

See PLITT, supra note 9, at 57-58 ("[The duty of good faith] requires the

reinsured to disclose to the reinsurer all material facts which may affect the subject
risk. The extension of this duty of good faith is the related concept that reinsurers
are generally bound by the reinsured's good faith decision to pay a claim,
commonly referred to as the 'follow the settlements' doctrine. The purpose for this
rule is to prevent situations in which reinsurers, in attempt to deny coverage, use
against the reinsured the same coverage arguments made by the reinsured against
the original insured, essentially eroding the good faith relationship needed in the
reinsurance context. The limiting factor, preventing the abuse of this doctrine, is
the determination of whether the reinsured's payment was made in good faith.").
§ 142[c], at 1060. (noting that good faith "is the
position of reinsurers that their contracts are those of 'utmost good faith.' Utmost
good faith contracts of any kind are so delicate in character and so susceptible of
abuse that unusual precautions must be observed by both parties in their
implementation. The business of reinsurance often involves considerable oral
exchange of information between primary insurer and reinsurer, and the reliability
of this information is very important. The resemblance of the customary practices
to how business used to be conducted at the Lloyd's Coffee House of old is
unmistakable. The strict law of warranty which applied to the old transactions at
Lloyd's probably has something in common with the duty of 'utmost good faith'
which applies in reinsurance. Both doctrines have the effect of ratcheting up the
expectations contracting parties can reasonably possess with regard to the accuracy
of information shared by the other party.").
141 See JERRY, supra note 9,
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Second Circuit has noted, it is the core relationship that allows for
reinsuring to profitably occur. As they explained:
Historically, the reinsurance market has relied on a
practice of the exercise of good faith to decrease
monitoring costs and ex ante contracting costs.
Reinsurance works only if the sums of reinsurance
premiums are less than the original insurance premium.
Otherwise, the ceding insurer will not reinsure. For the
reinsurance premiums to be less reinsurers cannot
duplicate the costly but necessary efforts of the primary
insurer in evaluating risks and handling claims ...
Reinsurers are protected, however, by a large area of
common interest with ceding insurers and by the
tradition of utmost
good faith, particularly in the sharing
142
of information.
In other words, in exchange for placing the reinsurance at a price
less than the original premiums, the reinsurer is allowed to rely on the good
faith of the reinsured. 143 In order for treaty reinsurance to function
economically, the reinsurer cannot duplicate the underwriting functions
engaged in by insurers at the time they placed the original coverage.' 44
Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., Inc. v. North River Ins. Co., 4 F.3d 1049, 1054 (2d
Cir. 1993).
142

143

See JERRY, supra note 9, § 142[c], at 1060. ("Not all insurance law

doctrines are ratcheted up when it comes to reinsurance arrangements, however.
As one court explained, '[r]einsurance contracts, unlike primary insurance
contracts, are not contracts of adhesion. Rather, reinsurance involves two
sophisticated business entities familiar with the business of reinsurance who
bargain at arms-length for the terms in their contract.' Thus, a rule like the noticeprejudice rule, which is designed to equalize the relationship between insured and
primary insurer, may be deemed irrelevant to the reinsurance setting, and an
insurer that fails to give timely notice to a reinsurer may find itself unable to defeat
the reinsurer's late notice defense on the ground that the reinsure failed to show
prejudice.").
144See ERIc M. HOLMEs & L. ANTHONY SuTiN, HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON
INSURANCE § 102.4(a) (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON
INSURANCE] (noting "[u]nderwriting is largely retrospective, focusing on the
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However, that does not mean the reinsurer does not take an interest
in the underwriting activities of its reinsureds. As explained by the
Reinsurance Association of America:
While treaty reinsurance does not require review of
individual risks by the reinsurer, it demands careful
review of the underwriting philosophy, practice and
historical experience of the ceding insurer, including a
thoughtful evaluation of the company's attitude toward
claims management, engineering control, as well as the
management's general
background, expertise and
45
planned objectives.1
Keeping these criteria in mind, it is difficult to imagine insurance
companies would not create and institutionalize underwriting practices that
are most likely to attract reinsurers if they want to benefit from
reinsurance.' 46 Moreover, the reinsured company would want to ensure
that it kept particularly good records of its underwriting efforts, as they are
required by their good faith obligation to "disclose
to the reinsurer all
47
material facts which may affect the subject risk".1
So great is the reinsurer recognition of their risk in relying on the
underwriting decisions of their reinsured's that reinsurance contracts
frequently include a clause which allows the reinsurer access to their
reinsured's "books and claims and underwriting files", 148 if it finds such an
financial condition and expertise of the ceding insurer. A reinsurer would be welladvised, however, to undertake a careful review of the practices and standards of a
prospective reinsured under a treaty. Many reinsurance treaties embody
longstanding relationships between the parties and have been renewed many times
over the decades.").
145

See Reinsurance Association of America, supra note 11, at 7.

146
See STARING, supra note 20, § 2:6, at 7. ("The reinsurer will always have at
least a general, if not a particular, interest in the integrity of the reinsured's
underwriting and claims practices.").
147
See
148

PLrrT, supra note 9, § 9:17, at 57.

See STARING, supra note 20, §15:8.
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audit necessary. Known as "audit and inspection clauses", these clauses
require "the reinsured's records relative to the contract sessions to be
always open to the reinsurer at reasonable times.' ' 149 These clauses offer an
opportunity for the reinsurer to review their reinsured's underwriting and
claims handling practices to assure itself that the reinsured company is
acting in conformance with its expectations and that the claims made on it
come within scope of its reinsurance contract.1 50 By this method,
reinsurer's have the capacity to keep themselves abreast of their reinsured's
underwriting and claims handling practices in an ongoing manner, when
such inquiry is reasonable. And, in the event of a dispute it allows them the
opportunity for a direct audit.
ii. The Capacity of Reinsurance to Stifle Underwriting
Innovation
The search for information implies the capacity for reaction. The
interplay of the duty of good faith and audit clauses offer the reinsurer the
opportunity to monitor their reinsured's practices. Such monitoring has the
capacity to influence the way in which reinsured's create and apply their
underwriting discretion. Particularly for smaller insurance companies,
dependant on reinsurance to take on the larger risks, it would not be
beneficial to adopt underwriting practices which stray too far from the
industry's accepted norm. 5 '
Should such a company attempt it,
undoubtedly the company would have to charge higher premiums in order

Id. (noting that this right is not without limits and does not permit access to
all the reinsured's books generally, rather the audit is limited to the scope of the
relationship between the parties).
149

Id.(noting that audit and inspection clauses are found in both treaty and
facultative agreements so that treaty reinsured must make available their relevant
books and facultative reinsured's must keep the reinsurer "advised at various levels
of detail with respect to claims under the policy").
150

151 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supranote 11, at 5-6 (noting
"reinsurers often provide insurers with a variety of other services. Some reinsurers
provide guidance to insurers in underwriting, claims reserving and handling,
investments, and even general management. These services are particularly
important to smaller companies interested in entering new lines of insurance.").
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to entice reinsurers to take on their risks. 52 Likewise, those companies
which require greater amounts of reinsurance to comply with their reserve
requirements could also be
discouraged from adopting broader or unusual
53
underwriting procedures.
The inclusion of the reinsurer's interest of "underwriting
philosophy", "historical experience of the ceding insurer" and "attention to
the attitude of claims management" suggest that to the extent the industry
profits from and seeks reinsurance for its business interests, those interests
will militate in favor of choices which may not be completely congruent
with all aspects of the regulators objectives; particularly those objectives
which come within the broad understating of aequum et bonum. It is not
beyond the realm of possibility that access to insurance could be restricted
for less profitable groups or only offered at a higher cost, implicating
notions of fairness.
Though reinsurance monitoring may have the capacity to
somewhat stifle or raise the cost of innovation, perhaps even to the point of
raising issues of unfairness, there may well be some positive public good
from the effect of reinsurance monitoring of underwriting practices.
Reinsurers' interest in the underwriting and claim handling processes of its
reinsureds might well suffice as a strong financial incentive towards
maintaining professional and non-biased underwriting practices - a
regulatory goal. The reinsurer's sole interest is its own financial one. To
that end, the industry will seek out and reward those insurers who most
accurately measure and rate risks. Though the reinsurance industry may
not have an active incentive to broaden access to insurance for public
policy reasons, it also has no active disincentive to restrict the sale of
properly underwritten policies. As a whole, reinsurers profit from having
insurance policies available to reinsure. Given the capacity for reinsurance
to assist small insurers to compete on an asset basis with larger companies,
New insurance lines are often covered facultatively until a sufficient loss
history is developed to attract treaty reinsurance. See Hoffman, supra note 3, at
771. ("Demand for facultative reinsurance also exists for new insurance lines,
specialty lines, or insurance products that are developed to cover traditionally
uninsured risks. Such risks and exposures, if accepted by a reinsurer, are likely to
be accepted only on a facultative basis because they transcend existing actuarial
and ratemaking techniques.").
152

153

See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION

OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 48 (noting
the term 'reserve' means "[a]n amount which is established to provide for payment
of a future obligation.").
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reinsurance's availability can act to support companies writing policies for
previously underserviced policyholders. In any event, reinsurers' interest
in the underwriting procedures of those they reinsure undoubtedly serves
the pseudo-regulatory function of encouraging actuarially sound
underwriting practices by rewarding those companies with greater access to
reinsurance.
For this reason alone, reinsurance can be perceived as
effecting industry practice beyond questions of solvency.
iii. ReinsurerMonitoring of UnderwritingHistoryand the
Potential
For Market Response, the risk of reinsurance rate consequences
does appear to effect insurance industry practice. A look to the facultative
reinsurance market suggests that insurers are very concerned in maintaining
attractive loss histories and are sensitive to reinsurance costs when making
underwriting decisions. Remember, facultative reinsurance is used to
mitigate the effect of the phenomena of the unusual risk costing more than
the easily forecastable risk and is usually placed when the risk would not be
accepted under a treaty. 154 Again, it is through facultative reinsurance that
an insurer could acquire reinsurance for a specific risk, a specific policy or
a specific group of policies. 15 5 It is for this reason that facultative

See Hoffman, supra note 3, at 770-771 ("By definition facultative
placements involve risks that fall outside the general parameters of a treaty
reinsurance program. Facultative reinsurance is purchased by primary insurance
companies, captives, or reinsurers to cover assumed business that, for one reason
or another, will not be ceded to a treaty.").
154

See STARING, supra note 20, § 1:4 at 7-8. ("Facultative reinsurance of a
single risk, which was undoubtedly the original type, continued dominant until the
last half of the Nineteenth Century. A treaty, which is a long term contract
covering more than one risk, is known to have existed as early as 1821. Treaties
became common around the beginning ofthe Twentieth Century and one form, the
155

excess of loss treaty, is said to have become widespread as a result of the San
Francisco earthquake and fire of 1906."). See also JERRY, supra note 9, § 140[b],
at 1054 ("Facultative reinsurance involves the primary insurer entering into an

agreement for the reinsurance of a particular risk. The reinsurance can be written
on a pro rata or an excess basis; the root word 'faculty' denotes that the reinsurer
has a choice of accepting or rejecting any risk proposed and of demanding
whatever premium it thinks appropriate.").
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reinsurance "usually covers catastrophic or unusual risks". 156 Facultative
reinsurance, however, will likely be more expensive per risk than broader
treaty reinsurance because with facultative reinsurance the reinsurer often
employs "substantial personnel and technical resources" to underwrite
those risks. 15 7 Treaty reinsurance avoids this kind of cost
Yet, it is common practice to combine treaty and facultative
reinsurance to protect an insurer's loss history with its treaty reinsurer.
Companies often use facultative insurance to protect loss histories even
though reinsurance coverage for the facultative risk already existed under
treaty reinsurance agreements. The insurer's strategic decision to enter the
additional facultative agreement as a hedge against unexpected losses on a
risk is done with an eye out to protect against losses which would otherwise
have the capacity to trigger a renegotiation of the insurer's entire treaty or
cause future treaties to be reinsured at a higher cost.
58
As an example, the Reinsurance Association of America
describes a situation where in order to accommodate a policyholder, an
insurer may agree to provide commercial automobile insurance coverage a higher risk activity. The RAA argues that additional facultative
reinsurance 59 would be appropriate in this situation even if the treaty
reinsurance 160 the insurer had already placed did not exclude commercial
156

See Reinsurance Association of America, supranote 11, at 7.

157 1d. at8.

...See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, Who We Are,
http://reinsurance.org/i4a/pages/index.cfn?pageid=3615.
(The RAA describes
themselves as "...a national trade association, headquartered in Washington,
D.C., that is committed to an activist agenda to represent the interests of the
property and casualty reinsurance industry in Congress, state legislatures, and
international forums.").
159
See HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE, supra note 152, at §102.4(b)
(noting "[a] facultative reinsurance contract is written to cove a specifically
identified risk. Both the ceding insurer and the reinsurer have the option (or
'faculty,' from the Latin for ability) to affect reinsurance on a risk-by-risk basis.
Neither is obligated to cede or assume any given risk.").
160
Id.(noting "reinsurance treaties are blanket agreements negotiated between
an reinsured and a reinsurer under which reinsurance is automatically provided for
all policies issued by the reinsured that meet the criteria of the treaty. Treaty
reinsurance is sometimes (but rarely) called automatic reinsurance. When a treaty
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automobile coverage to "protect its losses under applicable treaty
agreements". As the RAA points out, the facultative "rider" need not even
be purchased from the treaty reinsurers, allowing those potential
commercial automobile losses to be handled under a completely separate
relationship. This suggests the overall cost of ongoing higher treaty
premiums is sufficiently grave to encourage the additional cost of "double
reinsuring" certain risks, even at the relatively higher specific cost of the
facultative agreement.
In any event, this common choice to pair facultative with treaty
reinsurance to protect loss histories 161 supports the conclusion that
reinsurance monitoring of loss histories does effect reinsurance choices.
This monitoring of underwriting practices 62 has the capacity to effect
underwriting decisions holistically and possibly industry-wide as insurers
choose to implement practices that conform to the reinsurance market's
interests and prevent them from making underwriting risks which may
negatively affect their reinsurance opportunities. To an extent, this natural
interplay of loss history with reinsurance costs can create a self-regulating
and self-limiting tendency among certain insurers to produce loss histories
lower than similarly situated insurers.
Whether this activity is congruent with all articulated insurance
regulatory interests is open to question, but there certainly exists the
potential for segmentation of the market and increased costs for some
policyholders. The simplest way for insurers to decrease loss histories is to
restrict their business to lower risk policyholders or limit their dollar
exposure to those risks. A "cherry picked" book of business, for example

is in force, the ceding insurer is obligated to cede and the reinsurer is obligated to
accept all ofthe risks within the scope of the treaty.").
See id. (noting "a reinsured can structure an elaborate program of
reinsurance using a combination of treaties and facultative contracts, using one or
multiple reinsurers.").
161

Not only are underwriting practices monitored on a general basis, but in
conformity with the reinsurer's need to rely on their reinsured's underwriting
expertise, the duty of good faith requires the reinsured to disclose to the reinsurer
all material facts which may affect the insured risk. See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN,
supranote 10, at § 16:03[a], at 1036-37 ("It is a basic obligation of a reinsured to
disclose to potential reinsurers all material facts regarding the original risk of loss,
and failure to do so renders a reinsurance agreement voidable or rescindable.").
162
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could attract more reinsurance interest; as a result, the cherry-picking
insurer can charge lower premiums to gain an even bigger bowl of cherries.
To the extent that this segmentation would not have occurred but
for the reinsurance interests, reinsurance can be seen as having an effect on
underwriting. There would still be an interest in insuring and reinsuring
lemons, of course, so long as they can and will pay higher premiums which
could be shared with the reinsurer, but the potential for reinsurance pricing
to encourage cherry-picking can be somewhat troubling. The competitive
advantage an insurer can obtain through reduced reinsurance premiums
may militate against the traditional benefits afforded by the law of large
numbers. The insurer could determine their best option for profit lay in the
reinsurance cost saving produced by the lower risks.
An insurer with a sufficiently broad market share and multi-line
business, of course, could get what would amount to a "bulk discount" for
placing most of its reinsurance business with one company. But, if smaller
insurers took the "cherry" approach and were rewarded with sufficiently
lower premiums to compete against even the "bulk" advantage, the move
towards segmentation would start when the big insurer slowly (or even
quickly) began to loose enough of its cherries to affect its loss history in a
way significant enough to offset its "bulk" appeal to its reinsurers.
Remember, the reinsurance market is extremely broad, with at least 50% of
domestic insurers reinsured by foreign companies. 163 There is likely
always some reinsurer around with a taste for cherries.
Importantly, reinsurance's effect on cherry-picked risk premiums
does not always result in the company actually restricting their business to
those "better" risks alone. There is no reason why reinsurance treaties must
be structured so as to take the entire book of business for a certain type of
risk, though they often are structured that way.164 An insurer could reinsure
with one company for their "better" risks at the lower prices, seek a
competitive advantage on the market, and move the worse risks into a
163

See

REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA,

supra note 11, at 1

("Reinsurance can be purchased from three distinct sources: reinsurance companies
located in the United States, reinsurance departments of U.S. primary insurance
companies, and alien reinsurers that are located outside the U.S. and not licensed
here. The ceding insurer may purchase reinsurance directly from a reinsurer or
through a broker or reinsurance intermediary.").
164 See HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE, supra note 152, at § 102.4A, at

32 (noting "[a] treaty may be written to cover some or all of an insurer's line of
business").
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different book charged higher premiums; premiums sufficient to entice a
different reinsurer. A different insurer could acquire better overall pricing
by averaging the two pools, but it could face difficulty getting those
cherries away from the segmented insurer, moving the whole market
towards segmentation.
There is also the possibility that certain types of policyholders likely corporate ones- which could be sufficiently attractive to an insurer so
as to make the relative reinsurance benefits irrelevant. If, for example, the
worse risks in one line were restricted to those who proved more profitable
for the company on some other business basis, like companies interested in
multi-line policies or companies which in some sense represent loss
leaders, the higher reinsurance premiums could be offset for even those
"worse" risks. This offset provides the book of business with a competitive
advantage. Yet, even that potential benefit would have to be consistently
reevaluated in relation to current market rates and costs of reinsurance. If
the advantage of getting the big book of business did not offset the higher
reinsurance rates, it would no longer be profitable, forcing the insurer to
raise its rates across the board. And, just as with the possible loss of
cherries scenarios described above, if another insurance company could
convince the multi-line user it was better served by spinning off the
insurance of its cherry risks for a significantly lower premium; such
competition could again support a move toward segmentation.
Unfortunately, in all these scenarios, there exists the risk of
identification of a certain class of generally unattractive risks with fewer
insuring options other than higher premiums. Hence, restrictive
underwriting in the search for lower reinsurance costs can be seen as
having the capacity to self-support segmentation through beneficial
reinsurance rates. To the extent that reinsurance was the "but for" cause of
this segmentation and increased costs for certain classes of risks,
reinsurance is acting as a regulator of insurance rates and should certainly
come within governmental regulatory review.
It would be extremely interesting to identify empirically whether
certain state actions, such as prohibiting coverage refusals to certain classes
of policyholders in their state results in an initial spike in the cost of
reinsurance for the reinsureds who must extend their underwriting in
conformity with those new mandates. Likewise, it would be very
interesting to determine how long, if at all, such a spike continued to exist
and whether a new underwriting requirement became sufficiently common
that the effect disappeared.
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iv. Reinsurance Clauses, Doctrines and Their Effect on
Claims Handling
As with underwriting165, reinsurance has the capacity to influence
the activities of reinsureds, or those seeking to become reinsureds, attitudes
and actions in the claims handling process. Because of the manner in
which the reinsured's good faith obligation 66 has been interpreted by
courts so as to offer the reinsurer a defense to its indemnity obligations, the
proper handling of a potentially reinsurable claim is likely paramount to
any prudent reinsured. Even though, as described below, the claims
handling would have to be so poor to constitute some form of "negligence"
to succeed as a defense, the risk of lost reinsurance funds is no small
matter. Further, given the fact that claims handling processes and
"philosophy" are reviewed as part of reinsurers decision to reinsure (just
as with underwriting), adoption of formalized claims handling processes
which would assure compliance with the reinsurance "non-negligent"
claims handling standard is not unlikely. As we will see, the actions which
a court might construe as "negligent" handling and investigation of a claim
are neither necessarily intuitive nor without cost.
v. Duty of Good Faith in Claims Handling and Court
Interpretation
In order to understand how the courts became arbiters of insurance
claims handling sufficiency requires some explanation of a few new
reinsurance doctrines and clauses - particularly the loss settlements or
follow the fortunes doctrine. 167 Again, a key point to remember is that the
165

See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 57 (noting

the term 'underwriting capacity' means "[t]he maximum amount of money an
insurer or reinsurer is willing to risk in a single loss event on a single risk or in a
given period. The limit of capacity for an insurer or reinsurer that may also be
imposed by law or regulatory authority.").
See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Seven Provinces Ins. Co., Ltd., 9 F.
Supp. 2d 49, 51-52 (D. Mass. 1998), affd, 217 F.3d 33, 40-41 (1st Cir. 2000);
Compagnie De Reassurance D'Ile de Fr., et al., v. New England Reins. Corp., et
al., 57 F.3d 56, 88 (1st Cir. 1995), cert denied,516 U.S. 1009 (1995).
166

See William C. Hoffman, Common Law of Reinsurance Loss Settlement
Clauses: A Comparative Analysis of the Judicial Rule Enforcing the Reinsurer's
167
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duty of good faith is mutual and has been interpreted to create a powerful
judicially-supported standard of care when
examining the insurer's
168
performance of its claims handling function.
Most reinsurance agreements requires the reinsurer to "follow the
fortunes" or "follow the settlements" of its reinsureds. These obligations
are somewhat intuitively understandably necessary so as to allow the
proper functioning of reinsurance.1 69 In short, the "follow the fortunes"
doctrine170 obligates a reinsurer to follow the underwriting fortunes of its
Contractual Obligation to Indemnify the Reinsured for Settlements, 28 TORT &
INS. L. J. 659, 659-60 (1992) (offering an expansive analysis of the reinsurance
loss settlement clause and the application of the duty of utmost good faith).
See PLrrr, supra note 9, at § 9:17 ("Duties of good faith and fair dealing
run between the reinsurer and the reinsured much as they do between the initial
insured and his or her insurer.").
168

169 These doctrines are often conjoined in court decisions leading to certain
amount of confusion in their analysis. See e.g., Litho Color, Inc. v. Pac Employers
Ins. Co., v. Home Ins. Co., 991 P.2d 638, 647 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). This
problem has been noted by both courts and commentators. See Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 882 F. Supp. 1328, 1346 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that
"[t]he term 'follow the fortunes" has been used imprecisely to describe the
reinsurer's duty to follow the claims adjustment decisions of the ceding company,
thereby giving rise to some ambiguity as to its meaning. 'Follow the fortunes'
more accurately describes the obligation to follow the reinsured's underwriting
fortunes, whereas 'follow the settlements' refers to the duty to follow the actions of
the cedent in adjusting and settling claims.").

There is considerable debate as to whether there truly exists a "follow-thefortunes" or "follow the settlements" doctrine in the absence of a "follow-the
fortunes" clause. Some treatises and courts identify a "doctrine". See PLrrr,supra
note 9, at § 9:17 ("reinsurers are generally bound by the reinsured's good faith
decision to pay a claim, commonly referred to as the 'follow the settlements'
doctrine") (discussing ReliaStar Life Ins. Co. v. IOA Re, Inc., 303 F.3d 874, 878
(8th Cir. 2002) (the follow the fortunes "doctrine posits that if the cedent has acted
in good faith in handling the claims presented to it and in providing coverage of the
claims, the reinsurer may not second guess the coverage decisions of the cedent").
Other commentators are explicit that in the absence of a general loss settlement or
other "follow-the fortunes clause" the nature of reinsurance as an indemnity
contract prohibits an implied-in-law obligation to reinsure a loss settlement unless
the reinsured can prove actual -as opposed to a good faith belief of- liability. See
Hoffman, supranote 174, at 679. The courts are aware of the split authority on the
170
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reinsured and pay its share of a loss sustained by its reinsured,"' according
to the terms of the reinsurance contract.172 This clause obligates a reinsurer
to indemnify its reinsured for its good faith payment of all claims that
arguably fall within the scope of the agreement - no "second guessing"
allowed.173
Likewise, a "follow the settlements" clause requires
matter. For example, in Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 882 F. Supp.
1328, 1349 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), the court, when finding in favor of the reinsured

Aetna, stated:
Under Aetna's theory, it is the settled custom and practice in the
reinsurance industry that reinsurers follow settlements entered into
between a ceding company and its insured, as long as the settlements are
made in good faith after a reasonable investigation and do not involve ex
gratia payments. Essentially, Aetna maintains that a reinsurer's
undertaking to follow the ceding company's settlements is implicit in any
contract of reinsurance, and enforceable even in the absence of an
explicit loss settlements clause. Home responds that in the absence of a
loss settlements clause, a reinsurer is not bound by a ceding company's
settlement of a coverage dispute without the consent of the reinsurer. The
courtagrees with Aetna (emphasis added).
The weight of authority appears to favor Aetna's position, although
the authorities admittedly do not speak with one voice. For example,

Gerathewohl opines that the "fundamental follow-the-fortunes principle"
generally applies irrespective of whether it is expressed in the contract of
reinsurance, i.e., in a loss settlement clause.
171

A reinsurer is not, however, required to pay losses "squarely outside" the

scope of the ceding insurers coverage. See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supranote 10
at § 16.01[a], at 1013.
172

See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Swiss Reins. Am. Corp., 413 F.3d 12,

1231 (1st Cir. 2005). The reinsurer cannot, however, be found liable for an
amount in excess of the reinsurance limit of liability stated in the agreement. See
Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., Inc. v. N. River Ins. Co., 4 F.3d 1049, 1070-71 (2d Cir.
1993). This includes the reinsurer's liability for "expenses" as well as for the
amount of the actual loss. See Excess Ins. Co. v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., 882
N.E.2d 768, 774-75 (N.Y. 2004) (finding that a reinsurers obligation for expenses
incurred while handling a loss is capped by the limit of liability in a facultative

agreement regardless of the presence of a "follow the fortunes" clause).
173See N. River Ins. Co. v. Cigna Reins. Co., 52 F.3d 1194 (3d Cir. 1995)

("'Follow the fortunes' clauses prevent reinsurers from second guessing good-faith
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174
indemnification of the reinsured for good faith settlement decisions.
Such broad grants of power by the reinsurer to the discretion of its
reinsured is seen by the courts to require the insurer to comport with a
standard of care appropriate to that level of reliance and in accordance with
its good faith obligation. In its application, a reinsurer will only be bound
by a reinsured's claims decision if the reinsured's decision was made in
conformance with judicially created criteria for identifying insurer good
faith .175 Specifically, the claims decision must have been made after a
"reasonable, businesslike investigation" into the propriety of the claim

settlements and obtaining de novo review ofjudgments of the reinsured's liability
to its insured."). This standard, however, is not always completely clear in its
application. See JERRY, supranote 9, at § 142[e], at 1061-62 ("The usual role of
the reinsurer is to 'follow the fortunes' of the primary insurer as if the reinsurer
were a party to the original insurance. Some courts insist that the reinsurance
agreement have appropriate language placing this obligation on the reinsurer, while
others presume that the reinsurer's obligations follow the form (although in most
certificates 'follow the form' language will be found). As the phrase suggests, the
idea is that the reinsurer is to accept whatever settlements the primary insurer
makes and participate and pay according to the reinsurance agreement the

appropriate share of whatever judgments are entered that trigger the primary
insurer's liability. Difficulties can arise in determining exactly what 'fortunes' the

reinsurer agreed to 'follow,' in that the reinsurer's obligation to participate in
whatever payments the primary insurer makes is not unlimited.").
174 In general, "[w]hen the reinsurance agreement contains a 'follow the

settlements' provision, the reinsurer will be bound by the settlement or
compromise agreed by the cedent unless it can meet its burden of proving either
that settlement was dishonestly arrived at, or that the reassured has failed to take all
proper and business-like steps to have the amount of loss fairly and carefully

ascertained."

OSTRAGER

&

NEWMAN,

supra note 10, at § 16.01[b], at 1020.

Unsurprisingly, there is some muddling of terms as regards the use of the word
"settlement" in various clause formulae. See e.g. Mentor Ins. Co. (UK), Ltd., v.
Norges Brannkasse, et al., 996 F.2d 506, 508, 516-17 (2d Cir. 1993) (construing a
reinsurance policy which provided that it was "subject to all terms, clauses,
conditions and settlements as original to require reinsurance "payment where
cedent's good faith payment is at least arguably within the scope of the insurance
coverage that was reinsured" using a "follow-the-fortunes" analysis.).
175 See Hoffman, supra note 174, at 692-93 (noting "[d]ishonesty, including

fraud, bad faith, and collusion, is a universally recognized defense to a loss
settlement clause").
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prior to granting it, 7 6 and where there was a "reasonable basis" to
conclude the underlying claim was covered by the reinsured's 's policy as a
matter of law.' 77
Since the obligation of good faith is mutual, the courts allow that
certain circumstances, indicative of a lack of good faith, are sufficient for
the reinsurer to be released from its obligation to reinsure. In other words,
the court seeks a way to make sure the reinsurer is not taken advantage of
by its reinsured. Particularly in the investigation and handling of the claim,
in the absence of a reasonable standard, the reinsured could foreseeably
choose not to investigate the claim properly to the financial detriment of its
reinsurer. For this reason, the courts require the positive duty of reasonable
and businesslike investigation of the claim by the cedent company. In
theory, this likely only further strengthens the already extant interest of the
reinsured company to be sure it is actually liable for coverage prior to
payment - another instance where reinsurance supports a public interest by
incentivizing prudence. In practice however, the availability of a defense
on these grounds may lead to a reinsured cedent being overcautious in its
claims review and handling at considerable expense.
vi. The CaseofSuter v. General Accident Ins. Co.
One "follow the settlements" case is particularly illuminating of the
capacity of "poor" claims handling to release the reinsurer from its
indemnity obligation. In Suter v. General Accident Ins. Co.,1 78 the court
focused on claims handling improprieties in its decision to release the
See Nat'l Am. Ins. Co. of Cal. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London,
93 F.3d 529, 535 (9th Cir. 1996).
176

See Hartford Accident & Indem. v. Colum. Cas. Co., 98 F. Supp. 2d, 251,
258 (D. Conn. 2000).
177

Suter v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 48209
(D.N.J. July 14, 2006), vacatedby, Goldman v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am.,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70406. Though this decision was vacated as a result of
agreement by the parties prior to hearing by the Third Circuit, for purposes of a
recent court's analysis of the requirement of reasonable "businesslike" claim
handling and investigation it is helpful. Instances where a court determines that
the claims investigation was insufficient are rare, making this case of particular
value for its findings of fact and reasoning.
178
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reinsurer of its obligation arising from the reinsured's settlement. 179 The
underling case and settlements involved product liability tort claims
asserted against Pfizer, as the manufacturer of allegedly defective heart180
valves, by patients who had received the potentially defective valves.
The manufacturer was the original insured which settled claims with the
consent of Integrity Insurance Company, the original excess insurer which
sought indemnity
from General Accident Insurance Company of America,
8
its reinsurer.' '

Interestingly, the "claims handling" improprieties identified in this
decision were all actually related to the reinsured excess insurer's legal
acumen and choices made in evaluating and settling the claim. 82 They
primarily were issues involving the proper acquisition of independent
coverage counsel and expert medical advice. 183 The court determined that
failure to seek certain types of legal counsel and take certain investigatory
I s4
steps, given the complexity of the case, constituted "gross negligence".

179

See id., at *77-85 (reviewing the actions of Mr. Reive, the Senior Claims

Examiner for Integrity Insurance Company, excess insurance company whose

reinsurance agreement with General Accident Insurance Company was the subject
ofthe case).
'"0 Id. at

*13-34.

Id. at *8-13 (Pfizer had a classic array of multi-tiered insurance policies in
place, with the company self-insuring for the first $10 million of liability, followed
by two primary policies issued by INA, the Insurance Company ofNorth America,
above which it had umbrella issued by Transit Casualty Company, along with
excess policies issued by Integrity, the reinsured in this case. Id. The Integrity
Policies "followed the form" of the Transit umbrella policies, making the policy
language of the Transit policies the subject of interpretation to determine the scope
of Integrity's liability. Id. at *10).
18l

i82 Id. at *34-66

Id. at *81-85. ("for a case of this legal and medical complexity industry
standards required Integrity to first obtain expert medical advice as to when bodily
injury actually occurred and to retain its own coverage counsel for an opinion as to
183

the appropriate trigger of coverage. The failure to do so ... breached Integrity's

duty to Generall Accident to make a reasonable, businesslike determination as to
whether the Shiley Heart valve claims should have been allowed.").
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The court cited the insurer's reliance on another insurer's counsel for its
appraisal of potential liability as inappropriate.18 5 Likewise, it cited failure
of the insurer to hire its own medical expert (again it had relied on another
insurer's expert) to advise on the heart-valves potential for bodily injury
and a failure of the insurer to keep up to date on the laws of trigger of
coverage as determinative factors.' 86 Relying on these claims settlement
investigation failures, the court further determined that the insurer had
failed "breached its duty to General accident [the reinsurer] to make a
reasonable, businesslike determination as to whether the [heart valve]
claims should have been allowed."' 87 The court also found the Pfizer
claims beyond the scope of Integrity's policies and Integrity's settlement of
the Pfizer claims to have been so grossly negligent so as to constitute badfaith. 188 As such, the reinsurer was freed from its presumptively applicable
duty to follow the insurer's settlement. 189
To those familiar with the tort litigation process, this demonstrates
a privately assumed obligation's effect on the legal process and litigation
costs. By focusing on the insurer's choice not to hire independent counsel
or rely on other medical experts as grounds for release from reinsurance
obligations, even in a case like Suter where such reliance was self184Suter

v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 48209, at
*84 (D.N.J. July 14, 2006). The court's analysis of the "follow the settlements
doctrine" requirement that the reinsured's duty to make a reasonable, businesslike
investigation noted:
What is a reasonable, businesslike investigation of course must depend on the
facts of each case. The factual findings support the conclusion that Mr. Reive's
investigation was anything but reasonable and businesslike. Mr. Reive's
investigation of the Pfizer claim was superficial, relying as it did on Pfizer's
position and opinions of Transit's counsel, which were even at times inaccurate.

The defendant has demonstrated that Mr. Reive did not make the kind of
reasonable and businesslike investigation that the circumstances required. Id.
"' Id. at *84-5.
186Id.at *81-85.

187 Id. at *85.
188 Id.at *85-86.
189

id.
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evidently imprudent, the court explicitly allows the reinsurance contract
obligation of reasonable investigation to affect the insurer's business
judgment to save the cost of its own counsel or experts. 190 In effect, this
type of decision will require the use of coverage counsel by each insurer
implicated on a sufficiently "complex" claim that may implicate its
reinsurance. It also has the potential to institutionalize the added cost of
duplicative legal analysis and investigation of claims where reinsurance is
implicated. 191

To be sure, the Suter case, involved a significantly complex area of
bodily injury law where the opinions of qualified legal and medical experts
would likely have been sensible. Likewise, the Integrity claims handler
probably should have kept abreast of legal changes implicating its
obligations, given that directly relevant decisions had been made.
However, there is no evidence that Integrity's claims handler had been
acting collusively with any party, was attempting to perpetrate a fraud, or
was not subjectively acting in good faith. The importance of the decision is
in its recognition that the standard of competent and businesslike
investigation will be one of industry standards, as discerned by the courts.
It identifies how a generally common business practice can transform into a
legal obligation. Though the court was not incorrect in identifying that the
claims handlers ignorance may have been tantamount to malpractice in this
instance, the decision has the capacity to effect business practices beyond
the narrow fact situation of the ruling.
Though the application of the determined standard of care will
always be fact specific to the situation reviewed for reasonableness, the
capacity for a standard practice of requiring independent legal experts in
"complex" cases could easily trickle down to "moderate" cases and then,
perhaps, to "easy" coverage decisions. Even in cases where there would
probably be little disagreement as to the likely value of the claims or
medical evidence of causation, how could an insurer not be expected to
cover its risk with duplicative legal opinions when the claim implicates its
190 Suter v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 48209, at
*85-6 (D.N.J. July 14, 2006).

191 Good faith is a perquisite for application of a reinsurer's indemnity
obligations. See ReliaStar Life Ins. Co. v. IOA Re, Inc., 303 F.3d 874, 878 (8th
Cir. 2002) (finding that "doctrine posits that if the cedent has acted in good faith in
handling the claims presented to it and in providing coverage of the claims 'the
reinsurer may not second guess the coverage decisions of the cedent"').
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reinsurance? Regardless where the line is eventually drawn as a matter of
industry practice, one way or another, the litigation costs will eventually be
internalized by the obligated insurers and passed to policyholders in the
form of higher premiums.
Moreover, as the decision in Suter stems from the universally
applicable good faith obligation of the insurer to reasonably investigate as a
predicate to the reinsurer's performance under the reinsuring agreement,
this duplicative effort could become simple industry practice for most
claims in an overabundance of caution. 92 Even if there is no reinsurer
obligated on the particular claim, as discussed above, reinsurers investigate
and monitor claims handling philosophy. It is possible that an insurer
thinking about their future interest in reinsurance will take steps to ensure
their claims handling demonstrates their history of operating in a nongrossly negligent manner and, if that requires a showing of the consistent
use of its own independent medical experts and coverage counsel, such
would likely be undertaken.
One caveat: it is of course possible that this added duplicative cost
could be so cost prohibitive the insurer would prefer to simply avoid
reinsurers and internalize the litigation savings. As described above, the
benefits of reinsurance, particularly the ability to stabilize profits and
leverage reserves makes such a choice unlikely. 93 For various reasons, an
insurer remains aware of the chance it will in future need reinsurance. If
anything, knowingly producing largely duplicative legal work would
simply lead insurers to pressure their attorneys to reduce the cost of
redundant legal services, if it cannot reduce the need to complete the work
in the first place. Perhaps this accounts for some of the insurance
industry's interest in creating legal services compensation structures which
offer opportunities for "bulk rate" services and long-term billing
agreements.
Suter v. General Accident Ins. Co., 424 F. Supp 2d 781, 784, 788, 792
(D.N.J. 2006).
192

19' REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF

AMERICA,

supra note 11, at 4 (noting

"[i]nsurers often seek to reduce the wide swings in profit and loss margins inherent
to the insurance business. These fluctuations result, inpart, from the unique nature
of insurance, which involves pricing a product whose actual cost will not be known
until sometime in the future. Through reinsurance, insurers can reduce these
fluctuations in loss experience, and stabilize the company's overall operating

results.").
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C. CONSUMER PROTECTION:

DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, BAD

FAITH AND REINSURANCE COVERAGE
Since reinsurance is considered a business to business transaction,
it is subject to significantly less regulatory oversight beyond issues of
solvency. As described above, however, reinsurance's ability to indirectly
affect the policyholder though inculcating and rewarding reinsurer-focused
underwriting decisions and claims handling processes exist and current
regulatory schemes do not address them. Yet they implicate issues of grave
public policy. As described below, reinsurance clauses have been held
valid so as to provide reinsurance for the bringing of a declaratory
judgment action against the original insured to obviate coverage. Other
approved clauses even allow for the reinsurance ofjudgments in excess of
loss resulting from insurer bad faith and clauses which offer reinsurance for
extracontractual damages arising from a bad faith tort suits. Each of these
has the capacity to support rather than prohibit unfair insurance practices.
If for no other reason than the moral hazard of reinsuring tortious conduct.
As regards declaratory judgments, many reinsurance agreements
include a clause which states that the agreement covers "all expenses
,, 194
incurred in the investigation and settlements of claims or suits".
Such a
clause makes sense in relation to the reinsurer's interest in not
indemnifying claims beyond the scope of the policy they are reinsuring.
These clauses have been construed to reinsure the cost of declaratory
judgments brought against the primary insured policyholder to obviate
coverage. To an extent, it makes sense for the reinsured to seek to lay-off
these declaratory judgment costs to the reinsurer where much of the benefit
of the coverage determination would accrue to the reinsurer on the risk.
However, the availability of such coverage can only incentivize an
increased use of the declaratory judgment mechanism. In fact, given the
broad reaching good faith obligation of the reinsured, failure to bring the
declaratory judgment action could potentially be seen as negligent.
These clauses are very common and often interpreted broadly.' 95
Moreover, in the absence of an exclusion, the "standard practice" of the
industry to allow for such costs can create a sufficient question of fact to
194 See PLITT, supra note 9, at §9:29.

See Employers Ins. Co. v. American Reins. Co., 256 F. Supp.2d 923, 92526 (W.D. Wis. 2003).
195
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support an implied modification of the contract sufficient to defeat a
motion for summary judgment. 96 Likewise, despite the absence of a
clause, declaratory judgment costs have been upheld as part of the contract
as a result of the parties "custom and practice". 19
Other particularly worrisome reinsurance clauses implicate insurer
bad faith. For example, one available clause makes reinsurance coverage
available for judgments in excess of policy limits arising out of the
reinsured's bad faith failure to settle or defend a claim and another allows
for reinsurance of bad faith judgments and other extracontractual damages.
Called "judgment in excess of policy limits" and "extracontractual
obligations" clauses, these provisions allow insurers to be indemnified for
their own bad faith actions against their policy holders.
As reported in Ostrager & Newman's Handbook on Insurance
Coverage Disputes, a judgment in excess of policy limits clause generally
provides "in word or substance"198:
It is agreed that should the ceding insurer become legally obligated
to pay a loss in excess of policy limits by reason of alleged or actual
negligence, fraud or bad faith in rejecting an offer of settlement or in the
defense or trial of any action against an insured, the Reinsurer agrees to
assume
% of said loss [in excess of the ceding insurer's] $ __
retention. l These clauses are "relatively widely used and provide[] the
reinsurer will participate in such excess verdicts but not to exceed the
reinsurance contract limits" 2° Moreover, there are iterations of this clause
which explicitly provide for coverage of "punitive damages".20 ' Other
courts have found reinsurer's liable for extracontractual damages even in

See Premier Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 35 F. Supp. 2d
348, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
196

197 See Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. Constitution Reins. Corp., 416 Mass. *839,
*846 (1994).

198 See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supranote 10, at § 16.06[a].
199Id.
200 id.
201

id.
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the absence of such a clause, but where the reinsurance agreement does
202
contain the common "follow the fortunes" language.
The second bad faith related clause covering extracontractual
obligations or ECO's differs from that of the "excess judgments clause" in
that it directly allows for reinsurance indemnification for tortious insurer
bad faith awards. 203 Its purpose has been described thusly:
When an insurance company finds itself on the wrong side of a bad
faith case, a judgment awarding punitive damages often results and
theinsurance company must pay the judgment out of its own funds unless it
has insured itself, through reinsurance programs or other means, against
punitive damages awards. Many reinsurance agreements have a special
provision called an extracontractual obligations clause, which typically
provides that the reinsurer will pay some percentage of the reinsured's
liability for claims brought against it outside of the terms of underlying
insurance contracts. It is well understood in the industry that the ECO
clause is designed to respond to bad faith punitive damages awards against
the reinsured.2°
Prior to the creation of ECO clauses, the ability of insurers to layoff the costs of their own bad faith actions had been limited to the
availability of reinsurance for only judgments in excess of policy limits.
The ECO clause sought to broaden this limitation by extending reinsurance
for tortious bad faith judgments as well as judgments in excess of policy
limits. 20 5 ECO clauses offer reinsurance coverage for an insurer's bad faith
202 I d. (citing

Peerless Ins. Co. v. Inland Mut. Ins. Co., 251 F.2d 696, 697 (4th

Cir. 1958)).
See Larry P. Schiffer & William Bodkin, Caveat Reinsurer: Reinsuring
PunitiveDamages UnderECO Clauses, 37 TORT & INS. L.J. 147 (2001).
204

Id. at 159. ECO clauses made their first appearance in 1978 in response to
the desire of primary insurers to secure coverage for the various tort claims that
had evolved into extracontractual, i.e., bad faith liability. Bad faith liability arises
separately from the coverage provisions of any underlying insurance policy or
reinsurance agreement, and results solely from the tortious conduct of an insurer in
the course of policyholder service or claims handling under the policy. Tortious
conduct may include: (1) denial of a claim based on inadequate investigation; (2)
intentional misrepresentation of a claim or policy; (3) false accusations against the
insured; (4) failure to disclose the rights of the insured; (5) unfair marketing
practices; (6) unreasonable rejection of an offer within the policy limits; and (7)
agent misrepresentation or fraud. An extracontractual obligation also may be a
205
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liability sounding in tort law, rather than arising from breach of the
insurance contact. Hence, the reinsurance clause which provides coverage
for those tortious damages refers to such finding of liability as an
"extracontractual obligation". Such clauses first began to appear in 1978 as
actions for tortious bad faith liability -and judgments- began to become
more commonly accepted.
It appears obvious that the availability of reinsurance for bad faith
tortious liability has the capacity to influence reinsured companies claims
behavior. In fact, it appears to be an obvious moral hazard. A bad faith
action can be grounded in a whole host of improper insurer activity when
servicing a policyholder's claim. As one commentator noted, examples of
bad faith tortious conduct could well include:
(1) denial of a claim based on inadequate investigation; (2)
intentional misrepresentation of a claim or policy; (3) false accusations
against the insured; (4) failure to disclose the rights of the insured; (5)
unfair marketing practices; (6) unreasonable rejection of an offer within the
policy limits; and (7) agent misrepresentation or fraud.2 °6
It seems apparent that so far as there is a regulatory interest in
preventing bad faith insurer behavior - an interest reflected in both
statutory and common law - the capacity to reinsure bad faith judgments
has the capacity to subvert that interest.
Considering that reinsurance agreements are supported by the
premiums charged to policyholders, it seems somewhat incongruous to
allow the cost of insurer's own bad faith judgments to be charged directly
back to policyholders in their premiums. In fact, it seems to severely
undermine the integral purpose of bad faith legal actions beyond the
reinsured's own retention, to allow for them to be reinsurable.
Clearly, this type of indemnification reduces the deterrent value of
these actions. There can be little deterrence through litigation and the
award of damages, tortious or otherwise, if those judgments are
indemnified by reinsurer's as a matter of course. Granted, reinsurers are
sensitive to loss histories so too frequent a number of bad faith judgments
could increase the insurer's costs to reinsure. Still, that market based result
seems somewhat less than the affect contemplated by legislators who enact
bad faith statutes and somewhat disjointed from traditional understanding
of the purpose of the tort system. In any event, these clauses identify yet
judgment in excess of the limits of an insurance policy, with the insured being
liable for the excess due to the mishandling of the claim.
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another possible contractual source of influence on reinsured's claims
handling behavior.
V.

CONCLUSION

Reinsurance agreements certainly have the capacity to influence
behavior.
The effect of these agreements and the manner in which
insurer
courts enforce their performance likely leads to the institutionalization of
systems beyond and not necessarily congruent with many of the
expectations and avowed purposes of some regulatory activity.
Insurance is often dubbed an industry affecting the public interest;
if that is so, then reinsurance should acquire that denomination as well.
Though silent, operating through private contract alone, it has the capacity
certainly to influence, if not directly regulate, insuring behavior. To be
effective, this Essay suggests that regulatory discussions of the insurance
industry be expanded to recognize the influential capacity of the reinsuring
industry. To fail to do so is to ignore a fundamental financial influence on
the entire insurance industry with the likely result that the silent regulator
will continue to operate below the notice of our sometimes raucous public
ones.
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